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1CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF COUNTERTERRORISM AND ITS REFORM 
 
I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW. 
A. America the Vulnerable. 
As Jonathan Raban writes in a 2005 essay in the New York Review of 
Books:
In its present form, the [American] War on Terror is a crippling, 
expensive, meagerly productive effort to locate, catch, and kill bad guys 
around the globe.  Its successes are hardly less random, or more 
effective in the long-term, than those that might be achieved by a 
platoon of men armed with flyswatters entering a slaughterhouse whose 
refrigeration has been off for a week.1
Sobering facts support Raban’s flyswatters-in-a-slaughterhouse metaphor.  
Stephen Flynn—a former Coast Guard commander and director of global issues on the 
National Security Council staff under President Clinton—has written an entire book, 
published in 2004, on the subject:  America the Vulnerable: How Our Government is 
Failing to Protect Us From Terrorism.2 Flynn argues that “[p]aradoxically, the United 
States has no rival when it comes to projecting its military, economic, and cultural 
power around the world”, yet “we are practically defenseless at home.”3 In sobering 
tones—linking our national unpreparedness for 9/11 to our homeland security at 
present—Flynn summarizes our current state of national vulnerability to terrorism in 
an extract worthy of complete quotation: 
If September 11, 2001, was a wake-up call, clearly America has fallen 
back asleep.  Our return to complacency could not be more foolhardy.  
The 9/11 attacks were not aberration.  The same forces that helped to 
produce the horror that befell the nation on that day continue to gather 
2strength.  Yet we appear to be unwilling to do what must be done to 
make our society less of a target.  Instead, we are sailing into a national 
security version of the Perfect Storm. 
 
Homeland security has entered our post-9/11 lexicon, but homeland 
insecurity remains the abiding reality.  With the exception of airports, 
much of what is critical to our way of life remains unprotected. 
 
* * *
From water and food supplies; refineries, energy grids, and pipelines; 
bridges, tunnels, trains, trucks and cargo containers; to the cyber 
backbone that underpins the information age in which we live, the 
measures we have been cobbling together are hardly fit to deter 
amateur thieves, vandals, and hackers, never mind determined 
terrorists.  Worse still, small improvements are often oversold as giant 
steps forward, lowering the guard of average citizens as they carry on 
their daily routine with an unwarranted sense of confidence.4
In the American constitutional system, of course, matters of foreign policy 
and national security are delegated by the People principally to the President and 
executive agencies under his purview—like the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the armed forces of the United States.5
The Congress, however, has from the founding days of the Republic exercised “[a]ll 
legislative powers”—and related specific powers—forming a tradition of vigorous 
oversight of executive branch activities, in general, and of foreign policy oversight 
and national security policy oversight, in particular.6 Yet, how has Congress 
performed its oversight responsibilities in the wake of 9/11?  And, how is it equipped 
to handle oversight of national counterterrorism policy and its implementation in the 
remainder of the first decade of the twenty-first century?  Trying to provide some  
 
3tentative answers to the aforementioned two questions will be the overarching 
purposes of this Article.  
B.  Congressional Oversight of 9/11 and its Failure.
Just when the Nation needed adroit and resolute oversight of the 
causes and meaning of 9/11, the United States Congress botched the job.  Bigtime. 
Although the Congress went through the motions of overseeing how and why 
the executive branch—through such agencies as the CIA and FBI—neglected to 
anticipate and prevent the attack on America on September 11, 2001, for reasons 
which I seek to explain in this Article, the congressional exercise was a charade, and 
the publication of its two and one-half inch thick, royal blue-covered report entitled 
Joint Inquiry Into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist 
Attacks of September 11, 2001 (hereinafter Joint Inquiry Report or JIR)7 a dismal 
failure. 
 As I will demonstrate, the 9/11 oversight failure of Congress was due to a 
deficiency of institutional competence in matching and reigning in the executive 
branch’s effort to stonewall and obfuscate.  While Congress tried to save face for its 
oversight failure by acquiescing to the creation of the National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the “9/11 Commission”)8, this maneuver 
was not constitutionally contemplated congressional oversight but congressional 
abdication to executive branch manipulation.  The central thesis of my Article, then, 
is that Congress must resuscitate its institutional competence for overseeing 
4American counterterrorism policy and its implementation.  As I will explain, Congress 
can accomplished renewed competence for oversight of national counterterrorism 
through three specific actions: (1) consolidating intelligence functions, (2) fostering 
intelligence expertise among its members, and (3) experimenting with more 
decentralized and indirect forms of intervention with Executive branch 
counterterrorism agencies.  Yet, since what is past is prologue to purposeful reform, 
a substantial part of my Article is devoted to unpacking and analyzing what Congress 
did and did not do leading up to its issuance of the Joint Inquiry Report. Indeed, the 
meaning of the Joint Inquiry Report can best be understood as multi-flawed legal 
process.  Indeed, one of the purposes of this Article is to analyze the Joint Inquiry 
Report from three process perspectives: (1) the process of congressional oversight of 
executive intelligence gathering activities in order to interpret the meaning of the 
terrorist attacks of 9/11; (2) the attempt to interpret the process failures of 
America’s intelligence agencies leading up to 9/11, and (3) the attempt to 
recommend new government processes of national intelligence and security.   
 The remainder of the Article is divided into five parts.  Part II describes the 
origins, purposes and structure of the JIR—an undertaking by two permanent 
committees of Congress, one from the House of Representatives and one from the 
Senate.9 Part III discusses and interprets the findings and conclusions of the Joint 
Inquiry Report10. Part IV examines the recommendations contained in the 
congressional document.11 Part V focuses on the additional views (in the nature of 
5dissenting and concurring opinions) of members of the Joint Inquiry.12 Part VI 
discusses Congress’ constitutional responsibility for vigorous oversight of the 
executive branch, the lost art of congressional oversight, and some ideas for 
improving oversight of counterterrorism.13 
II. THE ORIGINS, PURPOSES AND STRUCTURE OF THE JOINT INQUIRY  
A.  Origins and Purposes. 
In the words of the Joint Inquiry Report, “[i]n February 2002 the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence agreed to conduct a joint Inquiry into the activities of the U.S. 
Intelligence Community in connection with the terrorist attacks perpetrated against 
our nation on September 11, 2001.”14 According to the JIR, “[r]eflecting the 
magnitude of the events of that day, the Committees’ decision was unprecedented in 
Congressional history: for the first time, two permanent committees, one from the 
House and one from the Senate, would join together to conduct a single, unified 
inquiry.”15 The three key purposes of the Joint Inquiry were to: (1) “conduct a 
factual review of what the Intelligence Community knew or should have known prior 
to September 11, 2001, regarding the international terrorist threat to the United 
States, to include the scope and nature of any possible international terrorist attacks 
against the United States and its interests”;16 (2) “identify and examine any 
systematic problems that may have impeded the Intelligence Community in learning 
of or preventing these attacks in advance;17 and (3) “make recommendations to 
6improve the Intelligence Community’s ability to identify and prevent future 
international terrorist attacks.”18 
The Joint Inquiry Report highlights the congressional oversight process which 
was pursued (in terms of documents considered, witnesses interrogated, and the like) 
to create a deceptive impression of thoroughness and completeness.  In this regard, 
the JIR states: 
During the course of this Inquiry, these Committees have held nine 
public hearings as well as thirteen closed sessions in which classified 
information has been considered.  In addition, the Joint Inquiry Staff has 
reviewed almost 500,000 pages of relevant documents from the 
Intelligence Community agencies and other sources, of which about 
100,000 pages have been selected for incorporation into the Joint 
Inquiry’s records.  The Staff also conducted approximately 300 
interviews and has participated in numerous briefings and panel 
discussions, that have involved almost 600 individuals from the 
Intelligence Community agencies, other U.S. Government organizations, 
state and local entities, and representatives of the private sector and 
foreign governments.19 
B. The Structure of the Joint Inquiry Report. 
The principal JIR consists of 435 pages (in addition to cover letters20, a
foreword21, a summary table of contents22, a detailed table of contents,23 
committee membership and staff rosters24, nine separate pages of “[a]bridged 
[f]indings [a]nd [c]onclusions”25 incorporated into the document, as well as a 17 page 
errata set of recommendations).26 
Part Two-Narrative-The Attacks of September 11, 2001 consists of nine 
principal headings: 
7I. The Plot Unfolds for the Attacks of September 11, 2001.27 
II. Pentagon Flight Hijackers Khalid al-Muhdhar, Nawaf al-Hazami and Salim 
al-Hazmi.28 
III. NASA Communication Intercepts Related to Khalid al-Midhar, Nawaf and 
Salim al-Hazmi.29 
IV. Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Midhar Had Numerous Contacts With an 
Active FBI Informant.30 
V. Associates of the September 11 Terrorists in the United States.31 
VI. Germany-Investigation of the Hamburg Cell.32 
VII. The Hijackers’ Visas.33 
VIII. The Rising Threat and Context of the September 11 attacks.34 
IX. The Development of U.S. Counterterrorism Policy Before September 
11.35 
Part Three—Topics—The Attacks of September 11, 2001 consists of fourteen 
principal headings: 
I. Counterrorism Resources.36 
II.  Foreign Liason.37 
III.  Covert Action and Military Operation Against Bin Ladin.38 
IV. Strategy to Disrupt Terrorist Funding.39 
V. Khalid Shaykh Mohammed (KSM): The Mastermind of September 11.40 
VI. The FBI’s Investigation of Zacarias Moussaoui Before September 11.41 
VII. The Phonemix Electronic Communication (EC).42 
VIII. Strategic Analyses.43 
IX. Views of Outside Experts on the Intelligence Community.44 
X. Information Sharing.45 
XI. Technology Gaps.46 
XII. Technical Collection of Terrorist Communicators.47 
XIII. Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Collection.48 
XIV. Summary of Joint Inquiry Review of Anthrax Attacks.49 
The final part of the JIR in chief, Part Four—Finding, Discussion and Narrative 
Regarding Certain Sensitive National Security Matters, is, perhaps, the most 
remarkable part of the Joint Inquiry Report.  The simple reason for its remarkability 
8is that, with the exception of a bracketed finding and bracketed discussion 
(indicating the alternative language of the original JIR language cleared by the 
Intelligence Community)50, virtually the entire 27 pages of this part are deleted!   
Following the JIR in chief is a “Glossary of Terms and Acronyms”51, a table of 
“Key Names”52, a table of “September 11, 2001 Hijackers”53, “Additional Views of 
Members of the Joint Inquiry”54, and a number of appendices attached at the end of 
the JIR.55 
III.  THE JIRs FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The Joint Inquiry Report contains five key factual findings and conclusions 
about the events leading up to the terrorist attacks on September 11, sixteen 
“systemic findings” and conclusions about the American Intelligence Community’s 
deficient counterterrorist efforts before September 11th, and four “related findings” 
and conclusions involving broader policy questions beyond the American Intelligence 
Community.  The discussion that follows attempts to deconstruct this “bureaucrat-
speak” and to reconceptualize these twenty-five congressional oversight findings and 
conclusions into nine generic process failures of the American Intelligence 
Community.  These nine process failures are as follows: (a) the forest versus the trees 
problem; (b) the right hand versus the left hand problem; (c) the Chicken Little 
problem; (d) the “who’s on first” problem; (e) the show me the money problem; (f) 
the dueling banjoes problem; (g) the through the glass dark problem; (h) the good 
cop/bad cop problem and (i) the Catch-22 problem.  As will be discussed in greater 
9detail, below, these nine generic process failures of the American Intelligence 
Community are interrelated and intergovernmental (horizontal as well as vertical) in 
nature. 
A. The Forest from the Trees Problem. 
The bulk of the factual findings and conclusions of the JIR can be better 
understood as a problem of perspective: while the American Intelligence Community 
was obsessed with gathering discrete details, the process of intelligence lacked a 
strategic capability to put individual pieces of the terrorism puzzle into a coherent 
and holistic picture.  Thus, the factual findings concerning intelligence on the threats 
posed by Osama Bin Ladin56, the spring and summer of 2001 information on Al 
Qaeda57, 1998-2001 intelligence58, aircrafts as weapons data59, and “collective 
significance” myopia60 essentially describe a failure of the American Intelligence 
Community to appreciate the “forest” that its “trees” of intelligence suggested.  
Moreover, two of the four “related findings” in the Joint Inquiry Report are in the 
nature of a forest from the trees process failure of the American Intelligence 
Community: the failure of the U.S. Government to “undertake a comprehensive effort 
to implement defensive measures in the United States,” despite intelligence 
information spanning the time of “1998 through the summer of 2001 indicating that 
Usama Bin Ladin’s terrorist network intended to strike inside the United States”61,
and the failure of the U.S. Government to benefit from “an alert, mobilized and 
committed American public” stemming from a lack of notice “to alert the American 
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public to the reality and gravity of the threat” of terrorist attacks before September 
11, 2001.62 Indeed, the general conclusion to the JIR factual findings consists of a 
lamentation over perspective failure before 9/11: 
In short, for a variety of reasons, the Intelligence Community failed to 
capitalize on both the individual and collective significance of available 
information that appears relevant to the events of September 11.  As a 
result, the Community missed opportunities to disrupt the September 
11th plot by denying entry to or detaining would-be hijackers; to at least 
try to unravel the plot through surveillance and other investigative work 
within the United States; and, finally, to generate a heightened state of 
alert and thus harden the homeland against attack. 
 
No one will ever know what might have happened had more connections 
been drawn between these disparate pieces of information.  We will 
never definitively know to what extent the Community would have been 
able and willing to exploit fully all the opportunities that may have 
emerged.  The important point is that the Intelligence Community, for 
a variety of reasons, did not bring together and fully appreciate a range 
of information that could have greatly enhanced the chances of  
uncovering and preventing Osama Bin Ladin’s plan to attack these 
United States on September 11, 2001.63 
Importantly, the first systematic finding also speaks of the fundamental failure 
of the American Intelligence Community to perceive the forest from the trees, noting 
that “[p]rior to September 11, the Intelligence Community was neither well organized 
nor equipped, and did not adequately adapt, to meet the challenge posed by global 
terrorists focused on targets within the domestic Untied States” because of “[s]erious 
gaps [that] existed between the collection coverage provided by U.S. foreign and U.S. 
domestic intelligence capabilities” stemming from “inadequate attention” by the CIA 
“to the potential for a domestic attack” and the inability of the FBI “to identify and 
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monitor effectively the extent of activity by al-Qa’ida and other international 
terrorist groups operating in the United States.”64 
B.  The Right Hand vs. the Left Hand Problem. 
A central feature of the factual findings and conclusions of the Joint Inquiry 
Report is professed amazement by Congress at the two distinct cultures of the CIA, on 
the one hand, and the FBI, on the other hand.  As one of the JIR factual findings 
expresses the problem, the right hand of the American Intelligence Community did 
not know what the left hand was up to in dealing with known terrorists in the United 
States before September 11: 
[Two key hijackers had] numerous contacts with a long time FBI 
counterterrorism informant in California and … a third future hijacker … 
apparently had more limited contact with the informant.  In mid-to-
late-2000, the CIA already had information indicating that [two of the 
hijackers] had [been in the United States] but the two had not been 
watchlisted and information suggesting that two suspected terrorists 
could well be in the United States had not yet been given to the FBI.  
The San Diego FBI field office that handled the informant in question, 
did not receive that information [from the CIA] or any of the other 
intelligence information pertaining to [two terrorists in the country] 
prior to September 11, 2001.  As a result, the FBI missed the opportunity 
to task a uniquely well-positioned informant—who denies having any  
advance knowledge of the plot—to collect information about the 
hijackers and their plans within the United States.65 
One systemic finding of the Joint Inquiry Report speaks of the two cultures 
divide between the CIA and the FBI and the attendant lack of information sharing 
between these agencies before September 11.66 A related right hand/left hand  
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systemic finding addresses the divide between the American Intelligence Community 
versus the non-Intelligence Community.67 
C. The Chicken Little Problem. 
The well-known children’s story about Chicken Little is a cautionary tale about 
the dangers of over-reaction.68 The deeper social problem, however, illustrated by 
the Chicken Little parable, is when real dangers are underappreciated and under-
deterred.  Part of this problem might stem from past exaggerations.  Part of the 
problem, in the alternative, might arise from too many tasks and not enough 
resources.  In either case, it is apparent that the congressional investigation 
discerned a kind of problem where FBI superiors underappreciated real dangers of 
domestic terrorist attacks from domestically trained terrorist-pilots.  According to an 
eerie JIR factual finding: 
On July 10, 2001, an FBI Phoenix field office agent sent an “Electronic 
Communication” to 4 individuals in the Radical Fundamentalist Unit 
(RFU) and two people in the Usama Bin Ladin Unit (UBLU) at FBI 
headquarters, and to two agents on International Terrorist squads in the 
New York Field office.  In the communication, the agent expressed his 
concerns, based on his first-hand knowledge, that there was a 
coordinated effort underway by Bin Ladin to send students to the United 
States for civil aviation-related training.  He noted that there was an 
“inordinate number of individuals of investigative interest” in this type 
of training in Arizona and expressed his suspicion that this was an effort 
to establish a cadre of individuals in civil aviation who would conduct 
future terrorist activity.  The Phoenix [electronic communication] 
requested that FBI Headquarters consider implementing four 
recommendations: 
 
• accumulate a list of civil aviation university/colleges 
around the country; 
• establish liaison with these schools;  
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• discuss the theories contained in the Phoenix [electronic 
communication] with the Intelligence Community; and 
• consider seeking authority to obtain visa information 
concerning individuals seeking to attend flight schools. 
 
However, the FBI headquarters personnel did not take the action 
requested by the Phoenix agent prior to September 11, 2001.  The 
communication generated little or no interest at either FBI 
Headquarters or the FBI’s New York field office.69 
D.  The “Who’s On First?” Problem.
While the late comedic team of Abbott and Costello achieved regular laughs in 
performing their play on words involving different baseball runners with pronouns for 
names70, one way of interpreting their routine is as a moral tale of the organizational 
risks of widespread incompetence.  Numerous findings of the Joint Inquiry Report 
portray an incompetent American Intelligence Community (an oxymoron of sorts) in 
disarray.  In the first place, three JIR factual sub-findings relate to specific instances 
of organizational incompetence leading up to September 11.  One sub-finding 
addresses the legal mistake of FBI officials investigating suspected confederates in 
the 9/11 hijackings71; another sub-finding focuses on the maladroit manner American 
officials handled the mastermind of the September 11 attacks while he was awaiting 
a trial for an earlier act of terrorism72; and a third sub-finding deals with the bungling 
by NSA, the National Security Agency, in neglecting to translate and disseminate 
intercepted communications that indicated that the threat of imminent terrorist 
attacks in September of 2001.73 
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In the second place, six systemic findings in the Joint Inquiry Report are 
properly categorized as “who’s on first?” problems.  First, systemic finding 2 states: 
Prior to September 11, 2001, neither the U.S. Government as a whole 
nor the Intelligence Community had a comprehensive counterterrorist 
strategy for combating the threat posed by Usama Bin Ladin.  
Furthermore, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was either 
unwilling or unable to marshal the full range of Intelligence Community 
resources necessary to combat the growing threat to the United 
States.74 
Interestingly, the JIR discussion supporting this systemic finding notes that 
“[t]he Intelligence Community is a large distributed organism.  It encompasses 14 
agencies and tens of thousands of employees” and “[t]he number of people employed 
exclusively in the effort against Usama Bin Ladin and Al-Qaeda was relatively 
small.”75 Yet, revealingly, Congress found that “these people were operating in 
geographically dispersed locations, often not connected by secure information 
technologies, and within established bureaucracies that were not culturally or 
organizationally attuned to one another’s requirements,” while “[m]any of them had 
limited experience against the target and did not know one another”; but, “[t]o 
achieve success in such an environment, leadership is a critical factor” and “the 
Intelligence Community’s structure made leadership difficult.”76 Moreover, in a 
searing indictment of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), the Joint Inquiry 
Report discussion concludes that the record “indicates that the DCI did not marshal 
resources effectively even within CIA against the threat posed by al-Qa’ida” and 
“[d]espite the DCI’s declaration to CIA officials that the Agency was at war with Bin 
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Ladin … the DCI’s Counterterrorist Center needed additional personnel prior to 
September 11, and the lack of resources had a substantial impact on its ability to 
detect and monitor al-Qa’ida’s activities.”77 
Second, systematic finding 5 at its heart, rails against the rampant 
incompetence of the American Intelligence officials, stating: 
Prior to September 11, the Intelligence Community’s understanding of al 
Qa’ida was hampered by insufficient analytic focus and quality, 
particularly in terms of strategic analysis.  Analysis and analysts were 
not always used effectively because of the perception in some quarters 
of the Intelligence Community that they were less important to agency 
counterterrorism missions than were operations/personnel.  The quality 
of counterterrorism analysis was inconsistent, and many analysts were 
inexperienced, unqualified, under-trained, and without access to 
critical information.  As a result, there was a dearth of creative, 
aggressive analysis targeting Bin Ladin and a persistent inability to 
comprehend the collective significance of individual pieces of 
intelligence.  These analytic deficiencies seriously undercut the ability 
of U.S. policymakers to understand the full nature of the threat, and to 
make fully informed decisions.78 
The JIR discussion in support of this systematic finding pointed up the absence 
of dissenting opinions in the Intelligence Community analysis provided to government 
policymakers, quoting the testimony of Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage, 
who observed: 
I am the consumer.  It’s very rare that we get the one off voice or the 
dissent voice ….  For a policy maker, the dissent voice is very helpful to 
either confirm what you think or really open up a new area, and this is 
not generally done.  If I had to say the one biggest weakness in the 
analysis area, I would say that’s it.  Second, it’s the way analysis in the 
Intelligence Community is generally put forth, and it’s related, and that 
is consensus … I really would just enforce this observation about the 
need to get alternative views up, because most everything that’s 
important here is shrouded in ambiguity and uncertainty.  There is a 
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tendency to want to get things scrubbed out to get the differences 
eliminated.79 
Third, systemic finding 8 addresses a “who’s on first?” problem: “the 
continuing erosion of NSA’s [National Security Agency’s] program management 
expertise and experience has hindered its contribution to the fight against terrorism. 
 NSA continues to have mixed results in providing timely technical solutions to 
modern intelligence collection, analysis, and information sharing problems.”80 
Fourth, systemic finding 11 focuses on ineptness, stating: 
Prior to September 11, 2001, the Intelligence Community did not 
effectively develop and use human sources to penetrate the al-Qa’ida 
inner circle.  This lack of reliable and knowledgeable human sources 
significantly limited the Community’s ability to acquire intelligence that 
could be acted upon before the September 11 attacks.  In part, at least, 
the lack of unilateral (i.e., U.S.-recruited) counterterrorism sources was 
a product of an excessive reliance on foreign liaison services.81 
Fifth, systemic finding 15 is related to the aforementioned systemic finding 
11.82 According to systemic finding 15, the American Intelligence Community 
“depended [too] heavily on foreign intelligence and law enforcement services for the 
collection of counterterrorism intelligence and the conduct of counterterrorism 
activities,” while “fail[ing] to coordinate their relationships with foreign services 
adequately.”83 
Finally, systemic finding 16 also reminds one of Abbott and Costello’s famous 
routine.  It states, in a sanitized version that had to be rewritten by congressional 
staffers to satisfy national security reviewers: 
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The activities of the September 11 hijackers in the United States appear 
to have been financed, in large part, from monies sent to them from 
abroad and also brought on their persons.  Prior to September 11, there 
was no coordinated U.S. Government-wide strategy to track terrorist 
funding and close down their financial support networks.  There was also 
a reluctance in some parts of the U.S. Government to track terrorist 
funding and close down their financial support networks.  As a result, 
the U.S. Government was unable to disrupt financial support for Usama 
Bin Ladin’s terrorist activities effectively.84 
E. The “Show Me the Money” Problem. 
The phrase “show me the money” was made popular in the film Jerry McGuire 
when co-star Cuba Gooding Jr. as Rod Tidwell, the pro football player/client sticks by 
his sports agent Jerry McGuire and insists that McGuire “show me the money.”85 It is 
an apt phrase to remind us of the importance of money—and the converse situation of 
a lack of money—in carrying out the pre-September 11 counterterrorism 
responsibilities of the United States Intelligence Community. Two systemic findings in 
the Joint Inquiry Report address “show me the money” problems: systemic findings 3 
and 6.  
Systemic finding 3 essentially blames inefficiencies in funding processes—
involving both Congress and the Intelligence Community—coupled with a multiplicity 
of appropriation requirements and priorities in hindering an effective anti-terrorism 
policy in the United States before 9/11.86 As explained, in cleaned-up-for-national-
security-language in support of this systemic finding: “throughout the Joint Inquiry, 
numerous officials … testified that the greatest constraint in their effort against al-
Qa’ida was the availability of too few resources, compounded by too many 
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requirements and priorities.”87 
Systemic finding 6 focuses on the lack of resources in translating foreign 
language terrorist information.88 The JIR discussion on this point simply observed: 
The language problem has been one of the Intelligence Community’s 
perennial shortfalls.  Prior to September 11, the shortages of language 
specialists who would be qualified to process large amounts of foreign 
language data in general, and Arabic in particular, was one of the most 
serious issues limiting the Intelligence Community’s ability to analyze, 
discern, and report on terrorist activities in a timely fashion.89 
F. The “Dueling Banjoes” Problem. 
The 1973 film, Deliverance, introduced the “dueling banjoes” scene and 
subsequent hit song, featuring two banjo players trying to out perform and compete 
with one another.90 While this analogy to the American Intelligence Community and 
military is imperfect (in the film a certain synergy developed from the competition 
while the pre-9/11 era American governmental action were discordant), the analogy 
is of use in depicting the degree of competitiveness between segments of the federal 
government in fighting terrorism.  Two systemic findings in the Joint Inquiry Report 
deal with “dueling banjoes” issues: systemic findings 7 and 14. 
Systemic finding 7 highlights the friction between three key government 
intelligence agencies: the FBI, the CIA and the NSA.91 One type of ongoing conflict 
was between the NSA and the FBI over which agency should collect potentially 
terroristic communications between individuals within the United States.  This 
created what the JIR called a “gap … between the level of communications between 
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the United States and foreign countries that was technically and legally available to 
the Intelligence Community and the actual use of that surveillance capability.”92 
Another type of perennial friction was between the NSA and the CIA over “which 
agency was in charge of developing and using technology when human intelligence 
and signals intelligence targets overlapped.”93 Specifically, the “CIA perceived NSA 
as wanting to control technology deployment and development, while NSA was 
concerned that CIA was conducting NSA-type operations.”94 
Systemic finding 14 addressed the distrust and tension between the American 
military and the CIA in failing to better coordinate operations against Al Qaeda before 
September 11th.95 From the CIA’s perspective, “the U.S. military often levied so 
many requirements for highly detailed, actionable intelligence prior to conducting an 
operation—far beyond what the Intelligence Community was ever likely to obtain—
that the U.S. military units were effectively precluded from conducting operations 
against Bin Ladin’s organization” in south central Asia prior to September 11th.96 
According to a former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, he believed 
that it was not the military’s key mission to go after Bin Ladin but, rather, he thought 
“that the CIA and FBI should have the lead roles in countering terrorism, and that 
military tools should be viewed as an extension and supplement to the leading roles 
played by the CIA and FBI.”97 Moreover, the former Chairman was of the view that 
“actionable intelligence” was too weak to outweigh the risks of military operations 
that would attempt to “swoop[ ]” and pursue terrorists in an undeclared war in 
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another country.98 Despite these conflicting positions from top government officials, 
the JIR indicates that some cooperation between the CIA and the military directed at 
Bin Ladin did ensue prior to 9/11.99 
G. The “Through the Class Darkly” Problem. 
According to scripture, some things we see “face to face” and completely; 
other things are seen “through a glass darkly” and known only in part.100 In other 
words, it is difficult to see through a turgid medium—even under the best of  
circumstances. Systemic finding 12 of the Joint Inquiry Report concentrates on the 
“through the glass darkly” problem in stating: 
During the summer of 2001, when the Intelligence Community was 
bracing for an imminent al-Qa’ida attack, difficulties with FBI 
applications for Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) surveillance 
and the FISA process led to a diminished level of coverage of suspected 
al-Qa’ida operatives in the United States.  The effect of these 
difficulties was compounded by the perception that spread among FBI 
personnel at Headquarters and the field offices that the FISA process 
was lengthy and fraught with peril.101 
The turgidness was one of law and the perception of law.  Judicial 
interpretations of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), supposedly led to a 
chilling effect on FBI agents who stopped applying for electronic surveillance orders 
directed at Al Qaeda suspects.102 
H. The “Good Cop/Bad Cop” Problem. 
The “good cop/bad cop” paradigm is useful in describing scenarios where, on 
the one hand, rules and processes are scrupulously observed, and, on the other hand, 
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these rules and processes are ruthlessly ignored.103 Systemic finding 18 of the Joint 
Inquiry Report can be understood as presenting a good cop/bad cop dichotomy.  It 
states: 
Between 1996 and September 2001, the counterterrorism strategy 
adopted by the U.S. Government did not succeed in eliminating 
Afghanistan as a sanctuary and training ground for Usama Bin Ladin’s 
terrorist network.  A range of instruments were used to counter al-
Qa’ida, with law enforcement often emerging as a leading tool because 
other means were deemed not to be feasible or failed to produce 
results. While generating numerous successful prosecutions, law 
enforcement efforts were not adequate by themselves to target or 
eliminate Bin Ladin’s sanctuary.  The United States persisted in 
observing the rule of law and accepted norms of international behavior, 
but Bin Ladin and al-Qa’ida recognized no rules and thrived in the safe 
haven provided by Afghanistan.104 
The JIR expounded on this finding by pointing out the incredible naiveté, at 
best, or recklessness at worst, of the executive branch of the United States 
government during the period between 1996 and 9/11.  According to the report’s 
discussion, “[s]ome CIA analysts and operators … recognized as early as 1997 or 1998 
that, as long as the Taliban continued to grant Bin Ladin’s terrorist organization 
sanctuary in Afghanistan, it would continue to train a large cadre of Islamic 
extremists and generate numerous terrorist operations.”105 Yet there was no 
systematic executive branch effort to use all available means to root out and disable 
Bin Ladin.  As noted in the JIR: “Despite the Intelligence Community’s growing 
recognition that Afghanistan was churning out thousands of radicals, the U.S. 
government did not integrate all the instruments of national power and policy—
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diplomatic, intelligence, economic, and military—to address this problem.”106 
Moreover, the analysis goes on to state that “[p]ermitting the sanctuary in 
Afghanistan to exist for as long as it did allowed Bin Ladin’s key operatives to meet, 
plan operations, train recruits, identify particularly capable recruits or those with 
specialized skills, and ensure that al-Qa’ida’s masterminds remained beyond the 
reach of international justice.”107 
The JIR’s most incisive support for its “good cop/bad cop” systemic finding 
culminates discussion: 
The reliance on law enforcement when individuals can operate from a 
hostile country such as the Taliban’s Afghanistan appears particularly 
ineffective, as the masterminds are often beyond the reach of justice.  
One FBI agent, in a Joint [I]nquiry interview, scorned the idea of using 
the [FBI] to take the lead in countering al-Qa’ida.  He noted that the FBI 
can only arrest and support prosecution and cannot shut down training 
camps in hostile countries.  He added that, “it is like telling the FBI 
after Pearl Harbor, go to Tokyo and arrest the Emperor.”  In his opinion, 
a military solution was necessary because, “the Southern District of New 
York doesn’t have any cruise missiles.”108 
I. The “Catch-22” Problem. 
 
This “Catch-22” problem, of course, is inspired by Joseph Heller’s famous post-
World War II novel109 which describes an American military rule allowing airmen to 
contend that they were mentally unfit, and thereby unable to fly more missions, with 
a cognate rule that such a claim conclusively indicated that the complaining airmen 
was not crazy and would, therefore, have to fly more missions.110 As I use this 
phrase, it seeks to convey the absurdity of having the United States Congress, seeking 
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to publicly assess and critique the executive branch’s intelligence failures in the 
years leading up to September 11, 2001, hamstrung by national security censors in the 
executive branch so that certain intelligence failures are unknowable by virtue of 
their deletion in the Joint Inquiry Report. 
The Catch-22 problem is most prominently portrayed in JIR systemic finding 13 
which consists of ten lines of bracketed and deleted text; not one word remains in 
the Joint Inquiry Report of systemic finding 13!111 We are given tantalizing hints of 
the content of systemic finding 13 in the discussion portion of the report.  First, the 
JIR, in sanitized prose, indicates that “[d]uring his tenure, President Clinton signed 
documents authorizing CIA covert action against Osama Bin Ladin and his principal 
lieutenants.”112 This analysis is followed by twenty lines of deleted text (including 
two bulleted items amid this text).  What are we to make of this?  Like an 
archaeologist, who finds a shard of pottery at an excavation site, we have little to go 
on—other than the seeming relevance of presidentially-authorized CIA covert action 
to systemic finding 13.  Second, we get another clue, however, in the sanitized text 
which follows these deletions: 
Former National Security Advisor Sandy Berger testified to the Joint 
Inquiry … that, from the time of the East Africa U.S. Embassy bombings 
in 1998, the U.S. Government was: 
 
… embarked on an [sic] very intense effort to get Bin Ladin, to get 
his lieutenants, thorough overt and covert means …. We were 
involved—at that point, our intense focus was to get Bin Ladin, to 
get his key lieutenants.  The President conferred a number of 
authorities on the Intelligence Community for that purpose [sic]. 
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Senator Shelby: By “get him,” that means kill him if you had to, 
capture or kill him? 
 
Mr. Berger: I don’t know what I can say in this hearing, but capture 
and kill ….  There was no question that the cruise missiles were not 
trying to capture him.  They were not law enforcement techniques 
….”113 
Aha!  If we were archeologists that clue might be likened to finding the rest of 
the pottery object such that we can now tell that the original shard came from a 
container which held precious potions.  Systemic finding 13 must deal (we would 
surmise) with the CIA’s covert attempts to kill Bin Ladin and his henchmen! 
A third clue to the probable substance of the JIR systemic finding 13 is an 
unsanitized quote: “As former National Security Advisor Berger noted in his Joint 
Inquiry interview, ‘we do not have a rogue CIA.’ “114 A “rogue” CIA?  Does this mean 
that Congress was onto some misbehavior of CIA operatives in trying to “get” Bin 
Ladin?  We are quickly disabused of this inference, however, in the fourth scrap of 
discussion commentary in the JIR that ostensibly supports the phantom systemic 
finding 13, quoting from the briefing provided by national security official Richard 
Clarke:115 
I think if you look at the 1980s and 1970s, the individuals who held the 
job of DDO, one after another of them was either fired or indicted or 
condemned by a Senate committee.  I think under these circumstances, 
if you become Director of Operations, you would want to be a little 
careful not to launch off on covert operations that will get you 
personally in trouble and will also hurt the institution.  The history of 
covert operations in the 1950s and 1960s and 1970s was not a happy one, 
and I think that lesson got over-learned by people … I think that they 
institutionalized a sense of covert action is risky and is likely to blow up 
in your face.  And the wise guys at the White House who are pushing 
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you to do covert action will be nowhere to be found when the Senate 
Select Committee on Intelligence calls you up to explain the mess that 
the covert action became.116 
So, we suppose—but really cannot be sure—that the JIR concluded that the CIA 
did a lousy job of “getting” Bin Ladin because of a culture that had developed in the 
American Intelligence Community that disfavored and discouraged covert operations. 
The “Catch-22” problem is also apparent in the sketchy, sanitized related 
finding 20117 and the breathtaking 27 pages of backup discussion that is redacted and 
deleted in the Joint Inquiry Report!118 We know by reading a sanitized version of 
finding 20 at the back of the JIR that it deals with “information suggesting specific 
sources of foreign support for some of the September 11 hijackers while they were in 
the United States”119 and information “concerning these potential sources of 
support.”120 We also know that the JIR complained about the “gap in U.S. 
intelligence coverage” and admonished that “[t]he Intelligence Community needs to 
address this area of concern as aggressively and as quickly as possible.”121 That’s it!  
Was it secret support from Saudi Arabian sources that is hinted at in the sanitized 
language of the Joint Inquiry Report?122 
IV. THE JIR RECOMMENDATIONS 
As a sign of the haste (and sloppiness?) with which the Joint Inquiry Report was 
put together, 19 specific recommendations were “inadvertently” left out of the JIR 
and should have been included following the findings and conclusions portion of the 
Congressional document.123 A cynic would be tempted to conclude that Congress got 
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so accustomed to having scores of pages of the JIR deleted by executive branch 
national security censors that they thought it would be a good idea to omit the 
Congressional recommendations as well. 
The congressional recommendations contained in the “errata print” addendum 
of the Joint Inquiry Report can be usefully divided into three overarching categories:  
(a)  suggested statutory changes in national security laws, legislative budgetary 
changes and the like; (b) requested reports from executive branch agencies on 
national security topics; and (c) suggested executive branch actions on national 
security.  Some numbered recommendations in the JIR errata print contain more than 
one category of suggested governmental changes; therefore, I will not bother to 
reference the recommendations by the number, but will simply cite to the relevant 
pages of the JIR errata print. 
A. Suggested Statutory or Budgetary Changes in National Security Laws. 
The first and most prominent recommendation for statutory or budgetary 
changes in national security laws is that Congress should “amend the National 
Security Act of 1947 to create and sufficiently staff a statutory Director of National 
Intelligence who shall be the President’s principal advisor on intelligence”124 with the 
Director—a “Cabinet level position”125—“hav[ing] the full range of management, 
budgetary and personnel responsibilities needed to make the entire U.S. Intelligence 
Community operate as a coherent whole.”126 As part of the JIRs recommendation, 
the Director of National Intelligence would have the legal authority, presumably set 
27
by federal statute, for the: (1) “establishment and enforcement of consistent 
priorities for the collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence throughout 
the Intelligence Community”127; (2) “setting of policy and the ability to move 
personnel between elements of the Intelligence Community”128; (3) “review, 
approval, modification, and primary management and oversight of the execution of 
Intelligence Community budgets”129; (4) “review, approval, modification, and 
primary management and oversight of the execution of Intelligence Community 
personnel and resource allocations”130; (5) “review, approval, modification, and 
primary management and oversight of the execution of Intelligence Community 
research and development efforts”131; (6) “review, approval, and coordination of 
relationships between the Intelligence Community agencies and foreign intelligence 
and law enforcement services”132; and (7) “exercise of statutory authority to insure 
that Intelligence Community agencies and components fully comply with community-
wide policy, management, spending, and administrative guidance and priorities.”133 
The JIR, moreover, as part of the proposed establishment of this new super-
coordinating and management czardom suggests that “[t]o insure focused and 
consistent Intelligence Community leadership, Congress shall require that no person 
may simultaneously serve as both the Director of National Intelligence and the 
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, or as the director of any other specific 
intelligence agency.”134 
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A second important proposal for statutory or budgetary changes, suggested 
by the Joint Inquiry Report, concerns a new national security institution.  According 
to the JIR: “Congress and the Administration should ensure the development within 
the Department of Homeland Security of an effective all-source terrorism 
information fusion center”135 (IFC) with the goal that this novel organizational 
innovation “will dramatically improve the focus and quality of counterterrorism 
analysis and facilitate the timely dissemination of relevant intelligence information, 
both within and beyond the boundaries of the Intelligence Community.”136 Despite its 
highfalutin name, the essential purpose of the “all-source terrorism information 
fusion center” appears to be the creation of a centralized intelligence agency (why, 
then, do we need both a CIA and an IFC?)137 
The Joint Inquiry Report offers a third suggested statutory or budgetary action, 
in the nature of oversight hearings.  As the JIR states, in this regard: 
The House and Senate Intelligence and Judiciary Committees should 
continue to examine the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and its 
implementation … particularly with respect to changes made as a result 
of the USA PATRIOT ACT and the subsequent decision of the United 
States Foreign Intelligence Court of Review, to determine whether its 
provisions adequately address present and emerging terrorist threats to 
the United States.  Legislation should be proposed by those Committees 
to remedy any deficiencies identified as a result of that review.138 
As a fourth statutory or budgetary suggestion—following up on other proposals 
for centralization and coordination139—the JIR suggests that  “Congress should 
consider enacting legislation, modeled on the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, to instill 
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the concept of ‘jointness’ throughout the Intelligence Community.”140 As revealed in 
the supporting language of this recommendation, the JIR appears to be simply calling 
for more, good-old-fashion American teamwork: 
By emphasizing such things as joint education, a joint career speciality, 
increased authority for regional commanders, and joint exercises [the 
Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986] greatly enhanced the joint warfighting 
capabilities of the individual military services.  Legislation to instill 
similar concepts throughout the Intelligence Community could help 
improve management of Community resources and priorities and insure 
a far more effective “team” effort by all the intelligence agencies.141 
Fifth, the Joint Inquiry Report recommends expansion and improvement of 
“existing educational grant programs focused on intelligence-related fields, similar to 
military scholarship programs” as a statutory and budgetary measure.142 As a sixth 
statutory/budgetary suggestion, the JIR recommends that “Congress should … review 
the statutes, policies and procedures that govern the national security classification 
of intelligence information and its protection from unauthorized disclosure.”143 
Interestingly, as part of this proposal, the JIR suggests that “[a]mong other matters, 
Congress should consider the degree to which excessive classification has been used 
in the past and the extent to which the emerging threat environment has greatly 
increased the need for real-time sharing of sensitive information.”144 What does 
“real-time sharing” mean?  The most plausible interpretation appears to be sharing of 
raw intelligence data as soon as it is reasonably made available.  Another 
interpretation might be access to a web-based data source where new intelligence 
information is regularly updated and revised.  Finally, the Joint Inquiry Report 
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indicates as a seventh statutory or budgetary modification in existing national 
intelligence and security laws: “as part of the confirmation process for Intelligence 
Community officials, Congress should require from those officials an affirmative 
commitment to the implementation and use of strong accountability mechanisms 
throughout the Intelligence Community.”145 The language—“strong accountability 
mechanisms”—reminds one of Orwellian-speak in his book 1984.146 One draconian 
image that comes to mind is the kind of “accountability mechanism” practiced by Ian 
Fleming’s character, Goldfinger, when one of his agents failed him (immediate 
electrocution and disposal).147 A less horrific “accountability mechanism” might 
simply be being fired from one’s job.  But, as usual, the JIR utilizes congressional 
jargon to make its points. 
B. Requested Reports From Executive Branch Agencies: 
Numerous requests for reports are interwoven throughout the fabric of the 
Joint Inquiry Report’s recommendations.  First, the JIR wants the President to “take 
action to ensure that clear, consistent, and current priorities are established and 
enforced throughout the Intelligence Community” and to make certain that “[o]nce 
established, these priorities” are “reviewed and updated” annually “to ensure that 
the allocation of Intelligence Community resources reflect and effectively address the 
continually evolving threat environment.”148 Under separation of powers principles, 
of course, Congress cannot command the President to undertake his independent 
constitutional powers as commander-in-chief149 or as leader of the nation’s conduct 
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of foreign affairs150; but the JIR apparently contemplates that Congress could obtain 
access to the aforementioned intelligence priorities information through Congress’ 
power of the purse151, by virtue of the following language contained in the 
recommendations: “the establishment of Intelligence Community priorities, should be 
reported to the House and Senate Intelligence Committees [by the President] on an 
annual basis.”152 Second, the Joint Inquiry Report recommends a raft of reports from 
“the new Director of National Intelligence, the Attorney General, and the Secretary 
of the Department of Homeland Security” to be issued to both Congress and the 
President “on a date certain” containing four specific matters: (1) an account of “the 
FBI’s progress since September 11, 2001 in implementing the reforms required to 
conduct an effective domestic intelligence program” including the “adequacy” of 
“domestic intelligence authorities” regarding the pursui[t] [of] counterterrorism at 
home and ensuring the protection of privacy and other rights guaranteed under the 
Constitution”153; (2) an analysis of “the experience of other democratic nations in 
organizing the conduct of domestic intelligence,”154 (3) an appraisal of “the specific 
manner in which a new domestic intelligence service could be established in the 
United States, recognizing the need to enhance national security while fully 
protecting civil liberties”155; and the somewhat repetitive request for a set of 
recommendations on how to best fulfill the nation’s need for an effective domestic 
intelligence capability, including necessary legislation.”156 Third, the Joint Inquiry 
Report turns its attention to the National Security Agency (NSA), presently lodged 
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within the Department of Defense (DOD), seeking a “detailed plan” by June 30, 2003 
to the House and Senate Intelligence Committees as well as to certain executive 
branch officials157 that addresses the following five matters: 
• describes solutions for the technological changes for signals intelligence; 
 
• requires a review, on a quarterly basis, of the goals, products to be delivered, 
funding levels and schedules for every technology development program;  
 
• ensures … accounting for program expenditures; 
 
• within their jurisdiction as established by current law, makes NSA a full 
collaborating partner with the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation in the war on terrorism, including fully integrating the 
collection and analytic capabilities of NSA, CIA, and the FBI; and  
 
• makes recommendations for legislation needed to facilitate these goals.158 
Fourth, the Joint Inquiry Report requests the State Department, “in consultation with 
the Department of Justice” to report to both the President and the Congress by June 
30, 2003 “on the extent to which revisions in bilateral and multilateral agreements, 
including extradition and mutual assistance treaties, would strengthen U.S. 
counterterrorism efforts.”159 Fifth, acknowledging the political reality of an 
independent investigative entity outside of the institutional structure of Congress, 
brought about by the demands of relatives of 9/11 victims160, the JIR requests that 
this entity, “the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States” 
undertake “and make recommendations concerning how Congress may improve its 
oversight of the Intelligence Community”161 including the following five policy and 
legal issues: (1) “changes in the budgetary process”; (2) “changes in the rules 
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regarding membership on the [intelligence] oversight committees”; (3) “whether 
oversight responsibility should be vested in a joint House-Senate Committee or, as 
currently exists, in separate Committees in each house”; (4) “the extent to which 
classification decisions impair congressional oversight”; and (5) “how Congressional 
oversight can best contribute to the continuing need of the Intelligence Community 
to evolve and adapt to changes in the subject matter of intelligence and the needs of 
policymakers.”162 Sixth, concerned about what it perceived as the aggressive use of 
classified information by the executive branch during the course of its investigation—
what Senator John McCain described as the administration having “slow-walked and 
stonewalled” the congressional inquiry163—the JIR made the following remarkable 
request: 
the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary 
of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Homeland Security, 
and the Attorney General, should review and report to the House and 
Senate Intelligence Committees on proposals for a new and more 
realistic approach to the processes and structures that have governed 
the designation of sensitive and classified information.  The report 
should include proposals to protect against the use of the classification 
process as a shield to protect agency self-interest.164 
Seventh, alarmed that the Intelligence Community had shrugged off 
responsibility for the terrorist attacks of September 11th, the Joint Inquiry Report 
sought a report from the CIA director “to the House and Senate Intelligence 
Committees no later than June 30, 2003” regarding “the steps taken to implement a 
system of accountability throughout the Intelligence Community, to include processes 
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for identifying poor performance and affixing responsibility for it, and for recognizing 
and rewarding excellence in performance.”165 As an eighth, and final, mandate for 
executive branch reporting back to Congress, the JIR focused on the President: 
The Administration should review and report to the House and Senate 
Intelligence Committees by June 30, 2003 regarding what progress has 
been made in reducing the inappropriate and obsolete barriers among 
intelligence and law enforcement agencies engaged in counterterrorism, 
what remains to be done to reduce those barriers, and what legislative 
actions may be advisable in that regard.  In particular, this report should 
address what steps are being taken to insure that perceptions within the 
Intelligence Community about the scope and limits of current law and 
policy with respect to restrictions on collection and information sharing 
are, in fact, accurate and well-founded.166 
C.   Mandates for Executive Action. 
The final category of congressional recommendations in the Joint Inquiry 
Report concerns suggestions (or demands) on executive branch agencies.  Ten calls 
for further executive action can be discerned in the JIL:
• A National Security Council-led and presidentially-approved “U.S. 
government-wide strategy for combating terrorism, both at home and 
abroad, including the growing terrorism threat posed by the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction and associated technologies” with components 
of the strategy to include “foreign policy, economic, military, intelligence, 
and law enforcement elements that are critical to a comprehensive 
blueprint for success in the war against terrorism.”167 
• The creation of the position of “National Intelligence Officer for Terrorism” 
within the “National Intelligence Council” who would be “a highly qualified 
individual appointed to prepare intelligence estimates on terrorism for the 
use of Congress” and executive branch policymakers.”168 
• The implementation, by the FBI, of multiple measures to improve the 
Bureau’s conducting of domestic intelligence by: better prioritization and 
enforcement of field office compliance, developing independent career 
tracks for counterterrorism, better training of strategic analysts, 
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establishing “a strong reports officer cadre at the FBI Headquarters” to 
ensure better dissemination of agents to analysts of key counterterrorism 
information, agent training for better use of strategic analysis, recruitment 
of agents with needed linguistic skills, increased penetration of terrorist 
organizations operating within the United States through “all available 
means of collection,” improved “national security law training” by FBI 
personnel, improved exchange of counterterrorism information between 
the FBI and other federal, state and local agencies, and remediation of 
“the FBI’s persistent and incapacitating information technology 
problems.”169 
• The accomplishment by the Attorney General and the Director of the FBI of 
expanded and improved intelligence data obtained by an aggressive use of 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.170 
• Transformation by the Intelligence Community led by the Director of 
National Intelligence, of the “recruitment and development of a workforce 
with the intelligence skills and expertise needed for success in 
counterterrorist efforts.”171 Greatly enhanced training programs should be 
launched and carried out in the following areas: “information sharing 
among law enforcement and intelligence personnel; language capabilities; 
the use of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act; and watchlisting[.]”172 
• Review and improvement under the direction of the President, of the 
budgeting process of implementing American counterterrorism policy 
including “consideration of a separate classified Intelligence Community 
budget,” flexible appropriations “subject to congressional oversight, to 
enable the Intelligence Community to rapidly respond to altered or 
unanticipated needs”; and contracting for a “rigorous cost-benefit analysis 
of the resources spent on intelligence.”173 
• Consideration by the President of possible amendments to “Executive 
Orders, policies and procedures that govern the national security 
classification of intelligence information” with an eye toward “expand[ing] 
access to relevant information for federal agencies outside the Intelligence 
Community, for state and local authorities, which are critical to the fight 
against terrorism, and for the American public”, while also reassessing 
existing presidential policy “to protect against the unauthorized disclosure 
of classified intelligence information ….”174 
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• Reviews by the “Inspectors General at the Central Intelligence Agency, the 
Department of Defense, the Department of Justice, and the Department of 
State” of the factual findings of the JIR, coupled with further independent 
internal reviews, “to determine whether and to what extent personnel at 
all levels should be held accountable for any omission, commission, or 
failure to meet professional standards” dealing with “the identification, 
prevention, or disruption of terrorist attacks, including the events of 
September 11, 2001.”175 
• Development, under direction of the President, of “a national watch list 
center that will be responsible for integrating all terrorist-related watch list 
systems”, while “ensuring a consistent and comprehensive flow of terrorist 
names into the center from all relevant points of collection.”176 
• FBI and CIA coordination and “aggressive[e]” investigation of “the 
possibility that foreign governments are providing support to or are involved 
in terrorist activity targeting the United States and U.S. interests.”177 
V.  ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF JOINT INQUIRY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 
A remarkable aspect of the Joint Inquiry Report is the inclusion of some 190 
pages of “[a]dditional views.”178 While the use of additional views in congressional 
committee reports is well known,179 their significance is under-theorized.  Are they in 
the nature of judicial dissenting or concurring opinions?180 Are they mere grand-
standing?  A review of some of the eight separate additional views, filed by nine 
members181 of the Joint Inquiry will touch on these questions.  In general, takes as a 
whole and considered together, these additional views highlighted the multi-flawed 
legal process of the Joint Inquiry. 
A.  Sen. Richard C. Shelby. 
The most prominent of the additional views of members of the Joint Inquiry is 
the filing of Senator Richard C. Shelby (R-AL).  The prominence of the Shelby 
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additional views is premised on two reasons: (1) he is Vice-Chairman of the Senate 
Select Committee on Intelligence182 and (2) his views are spread out over 135 
pages.183 Moreover, in a recent book, Shelby was quoted as saying this about the 
difficulty encountered in obtaining information during the Joint Inquiry: “You know, 
we were told that there would be cooperation in this investigation and I question 
that”, noting, “I think that most of the information that our staff has been able to 
get [from the executive branch] has had to be extracted piece by piece.”184 
Shelby’s additional views contained several acerbic nuggets.  First, drawing a 
historical parallel between the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 and the 
“devastating surprise attack the United States suffered at Japanese hands at Pearl 
Harbor on December 7, 1941”—Shelby urged the case for fundamental reform, 
stating: “too much has happened for us to be able to conclude that the American 
people and our national security interests can be protected simply by throwing more 
resources at agencies still fundamentally wedded to the pre-September 11 status 
quo.”185 Second, speaking of the structure and organization of the American 
Intelligence Community, Shelby lambasted the Director of Central Intelligence’s “at 
least partly rhetorical 1998 declaration of ‘war’ against Al Qaeda” and criticized “the 
centrifugal tendencies of bureaucratic politics” within the Intelligence Community 
with the upshot that the Community “responds too slowly and too disjointedly to 
shifting threats.”186 In this regard, he urged “organizational flexibility”187and “a 
continual process of ‘creative destruction’ not unlike competitive corporate 
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approaches used in the private sector.”188 Third, focusing on information-sharing 
concerns, Shelby went to considerable length in his additional views to critique the 
Intelligence Community’s failure to “connect the dots” before 9/11189; to describe 
the systemic and continual problems of information within the Intelligence 
Community190; and to enthusiastically encourage future breakthroughs in innovative 
techniques of information sharing.191 Highlighting the paramount intelligence sharing 
failures that he believed the Joint Inquiry’s investigation revealed, Shelby opined at 
length:  
The CIA’s chronic failure, before September 11, to share with other 
agencies the names of known al-Qa’ida terrorists who it knew to be in 
the country allowed at least two such terrorists the opportunity to live, 
move, and prepare for the attacks without hindrance from the very 
federal officials whose job it is to find them.  Sadly, the CIA seems to 
have concluded that the maintenance of its information monopoly was 
more important tha[n] stopping terrorists from entering or operating 
within the United States.  Nor did the FBI fare much better, for even 
when notified in the so-called “Phoenix Memo” of the danger of al-
Qa’ida flight school training, its agents failed to understand or act upon 
this information in the broader context of information the FBI already 
possessed about terrorist efforts to target or use U.S. civil aviation.  The 
CIA watchlisting and FBI Phoenix stories illustrate both the potential of 
sophisticated information-sharing and good information-empowered 
analysis and the perils of failing to share information promptly and 
efficiently between (and within) organizations.  They demonstrate the 
need to ensure that intelligence analysis is conducted on a truly “all-
source” basis by experts permitted to access all relevant information—
no matter where in the IC [Intelligence Community] it happens to 
reside.192 
Fourth, Senator Shelby’s additional views raise some useful points about 
intelligence-law enforcement coordination.  “The September 11 story,” as he put it, 
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“illustrates the tremendous problems of coordination between U.S. law enforcement 
and intelligence entities that developed out of a long series of misunderstandings, 
timorous lawyering, and mistaken assumptions.”193 Even after 9/11 and the passage 
of the USA PATRIOT ACT of 2001194, which amended the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (FISA)195, Shelby expressed frustrations that “[i]t took over a year … 
for the USA PATRIOT ACT changes to penetrate the U.S. Government’s entrenched 
‘no coordination” bureaucratic culture.”196 Furthermore, in Shelby’s view, “[i]t was 
not until November 2002 that the FISA Court of Review—the never before-used 
appellate body created by the statute—issued an opinion” overruling the FISA trial 
court that “the law … stands today where Congress intended it to stand” in passing 
the USA PATRIOT ACT in October 2001: “there is no restriction upon coordination 
between law enforcement and intelligence organs in connection with FISA 
surveillance or physical searches, and such activity can lawfully be undertaken even if 
primarily done with prosecutorial intent, provided that a ‘significant’ intelligence 
purpose remains.”197 Fifth, in strong language of rebuke, Senator Shelby castigated 
the domestic intelligence failures of the FBI leading up to September 11, 2001, 
concluding that the FBI’s “organizational and institutional culture is terribly flawed” 
and that the FBI “is fundamentally incapable, in its present form, of providing 
Americans with the security they require against foreign terrorist and intelligence 
threats.”198 Sixth, Shelby’s take on the CIA’s pre-9/11 human intelligence 
performance is caustic.  As he sees it, the CIA “has been too reluctant to develop 
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non-traditional” forms of human-collected intelligence and “has stuck too much and 
for too long with the comparatively easy work of operating under diplomatic cover 
from U.S. embassies.”199 Seventh, regarding the topic of covert action, Senator 
Shelby commented: 
[G]iven the unpleasant history of covert action scandals that have 
affected the CIA, one should not be surprised to find that—ironically, 
perhaps—the covert action infrastructure is a relatively cautious one. 
 Intelligence officers will often, and with good reason, hesitate to 
take operational risks or to push aggressively to accomplish their 
missions if they are operating under ambiguous or convoluted legal 
authorities and always suspect that they may be prosecuted or 
hauled before a hostile inquiry for any actual or perceived 
missteps.200 
Finally, Shelby offered separate remarks to the Joint Inquiry Report on the 
subject of accountability, “respectfully disagree[ing]” in his words from the view, 
offered by some officials, that Congress “should postpone holding anyone accountable 
within the Intelligence Community until [the] war” against al-Qa’ida is completed.”201 
As Shelby put it: “Precisely because we face a grave and ongoing threat, we must 
begin reforming the [Intelligence] Community immediately.”202 Speaking in a voice of 
agitated dissent, Shelby employed understated outrage in the failure of the Joint 
Inquiry to assess specific blame for the 9/11 disaster: 
The metaphor of “war” is instructive, for wise generals do not hesitate 
to hold their subordinates accountable while the battle still rages, 
disciplining or cashiering those who fail to do their duty.  So also do wise 
Presidents dispose of their faltering generals under fire.  Indeed, 
failures in wartime are traditionally considered less excusable, and are 
punished more severely, than failures in times of peace. 
 
41
Nor should we forget that accountability has two sides.  It is also a core 
responsibility of all good leaders to reward those who perform well, and 
promote them to positions of ever greater responsibility.   
 
* * *
For these reasons, it is disappointing to me that despite the Joint 
Inquiry’s explicit mandate to “lay a basis for assessing the accountability 
of institutions and officials of government” and despite its extensive 
findings documenting recurring and widespread [Intelligence] 
Community shortcomings in the months and years leading up to 
September 11, the Joint Inquiry has not seen fit to identify any of the 
individuals whose decisions left us so unprepared.  I urge President Bush 
to examine the Joint Inquiry’s findings in order to determine the extent 
to which he has been well served by his “generals” in the Intelligence 
Community.203 
B.  Rep. Mike Castle. 
Representative Mike Castle (R-DE) filed the functional equivalent of a short 
concurring opinion to the Joint Inquiry Report focusing on two issues that he sought 
to highlight: (1) the need for significant improvement in the performance of the 
National Security Agency (NSA) in obtaining better signal intelligence concerning 
global terrorism, and (2) the need for substantial, immediate reform “with respect to 
the management, coordination and oversight of our Nation’s visa program.”204 
Castle’s more telling comments concerned the matter of visa reform.  
Alarmingly, as he explained: 
The majority of the September 11th hijackers were wrongly admitted to 
the United States—in violation of U.S. immigration laws—as a result of 
decisions made and errors committed by responsible State Department 
and Justice Department officers.  The fact that many of them entered 
and operated in true name, further emphasizes the extent to which the 
current system is broken.205 
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C. Sen. Mike DeWine. 
Senator Mike DeWine (R-OH) crafted his separate remarks in the form of a 
partial concurring opinion and partial dissent from the Joint Inquiry Report.206 Even 
on those few points, where he seemed to be going against the grain of the JIR, 
DeWine’s dissenting comments were collaborative in nature.207 
DeWine made seven key arguments.  First, he asserted that it was vital for the 
Intelligence Committees of Congress to “improve the quality and quantity of 
oversight” with regard to executive branch agencies seeking secret authorization, 
pursuant to FISA, to conduct domestic intelligence.208 Second, in an intriguing 
proposal, DeWine suggested the need for improving the FISA process by requiring the 
appointment, by the secret court administering the statute, of “advocates”, chosen 
from a group of “pre-cleared attorneys with prior FISA experience”209 who—while not 
contacting or informing “the subject of the potential surveillance”—would, instead, 
“act as officers of the [secret] court, representing the legal position in opposition to 
the Justice Department’s application for a FISA warrant.”210 
Third, Senator DeWine parted company with the JIR’s recommendation to 
create a separate position of Director of National Intelligence, untethered from the 
CIA, observing that a number of experts had concluded that this institutional isolation 
would be “counterproductive.”211 Fourth, he urged the need to emphasize that “the 
Intelligence Community needs to pay more attention to the collection and analysis of 
open-source information” derived from available unclassified information like a 
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report, written in 1999, by a Library of Congress analyst regarding the risk of Al 
Qaeda suicide bombers flying airplanes into places like the White House and the 
Pentagon.212 Fifth, DeWine opined that the “Senate and House Intelligence 
Committees are asking for too many unnecessary reports” from members of the 
Intelligence Community.213 Sixth, he offered an innovative potential technique to 
enhance information-sharing among members of the sprawling and diverse American 
Intelligence Community.214 According to DeWine: 
A relatively simple way to address this would be through the use of a 
technology known as “multi-level security” capability.  Basically, the use 
of multi-level security allows computers users with different levels of 
security classification to get different levels of access to information 
contained and stored in a comprehensive intelligence database.  In 
other words, database users would be able to access only the 
information in the database that their security clearances allowed them 
to view. 
 
This would allow the myriad of intelligence agencies to safely combine 
all of their databases, including those containing the most sensitive data 
and make the entire combined database accessible to a wide range of 
intelligence and law enforcement personnel, without sacrificing security 
for the most highly classified data.  For example, a detective in 
Cincinnati who notices unusual activity around city hall could do a 
search of the comprehensive Community-wide database for “city halls in 
Ohio” and come up with some non-classified FBI information about 
possible attacks on city halls around the state or in other states.  He 
then would get a notification from the system that there was more 
information about the topic, but that it was classified at a level above 
his clearance.  At that point, he could go to his supervisor and begin the 
process of having that information sent to someone within the 
department who has the appropriate level of clearance.  This would 
help resolve one of the many information-sharing problems facing the 
Intelligence Community.215 
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Finally, Senator DeWine’s separate filing contains a thoughtful and in-depth 
scenario for changing the existing American Intelligence Community’s “[b]roken 
[c]orporate [c]ulture” which is risk averse, rather than prudently risk-taking.216 From 
his perspective: “A new organization must be built from the ground up as a small, 
agile, and adaptive organization with a corporate culture of taking prudent risks.”217 
Moreover, it would have a limited list of targets: terrorists, proliferators, and ‘rogue 
states’.” 218 And, its operations, according to DeWine, would emphasize “non-official 
operations or NOC’s” 219 —unaffiliated with any official U.S. government “cover” 
job220 and operating over long stretches of time with considerable autonomy. 221 
D.   Rep. Jane Harman. 
Rep. Jane Harman (D-CA) offered a few nuggets of concurring insight which 
enlarged on the Joint Inquiry Report.  First, she pointed out that the JIR 
recommendation for creating a Director of National Intelligence (DNI) would 
“empower” this official “to lead the [Intelligence Community] by pairing authority 
with responsibility.”222 By way of comparison, Harman pointed out that the Director 
of Central Intelligence “currently lacks the statutory authority” to provide “a 
coherent approach across agencies and overarching leadership.” 223 Second, offering 
a lighter touch than the tone of the Joint Inquiry Report, Rep. Harman opined that 
while “[t]he investigation revealed that significant intelligence leads about some of 
the hijackers were available but did not get widely shared,” this lapse “was less a 
willful refusal to share information than it was a failure to grasp its significance.” 224 
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E.   Sen. John Kyl & Sen. Pat Roberts. 
In what is, in effect, a joint dissenting opinion from the JIR, Senator John Kyl 
(R-AZ) and Senator Pat Roberts (R-KS) divided their concerns into three major 
headings: 
(1) “[t]he [n]eed for [a]dditional [v]iews,” 225 
(2)   “[d]efficiencies in the [r]eport,” 226 and  
(3)  “[c]omments on [r]ecommendations.” 227 
1. A Perspective on Process. 
We gain a valuable insider’s peek on the Joint Inquiry process from the 
perspective of two relatively junior and conservative United States Senators.  They 
begin their dissenting statement with a lament about how the content of the Joint 
Inquiry Report was assembled.  Thus, by examining their opening salvo, we can 
discern that they were displeased with the way the staff and the combined 
committees’ leadership controlled things.  As they complain: 
The Report is a product of the Joint Inquiry Staff (JIS), not the Senators 
and the Representatives who sit, respectively, on the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) and the House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI).  The Chairman and Vice Chairman of 
the SSCI and the Chairman and Ranking Member of the HPSCI (the “Big 
Four”) made most decisions and supervised the JIS.  The JIS should be 
commended for putting together the first official account of events 
leading up to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.  
 
It is difficult, however, for rank-and-file Members of the two 
Committees to know how thorough or accurate the Report is because of 
the way the JIS and the “Big Four” conducted the inquiry, withholding 
information and decisions from the Members and SSCI and HPSCI staff 
throughout the process.  While the Report should be a useful historical 
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document on which to base further inquiries, we cannot vouch for its 
contents. 228 
A second, process-pique of Kyl and Roberts was that reasons why mistakes 
were made by the Intelligence Community were not emphasized.  As they noted: 
After prodding by several Senators, some underlying causes of these 
failures were identified, but even then, they were not further probed to 
determine what might have been done differently.  And the fact that 
the prodding was necessary illustrates our concern that the JIS either 
ran out of time or did not have the inclination or instruction to examine, 
for instance, why U.S. government agencies were risk-averse, who is 
responsible for the inadequate resources devoted to counter-terrorism 
efforts, why legal authorities were so confusing, and why leadership 
was so lacking.  Without this examination, the Report will be of limited 
value in determining “lessons learned.” 229 
Fascinating stuff!  There is more process vitriol.  Third, Senators Kyl and 
Roberts groused that the Joint Inquiry process “was conducted and overseen in a way 
that left rank-and-file Members at a distinct disadvantage, and left insufficient time 
to examine many relevant issues.” 230 In this regard, they grumbled that the 
voluminous final draft of the JIR “was delivered to Members four days before the one 
and only meeting scheduled for its consideration, when most Members were out of 
town.” 231 Moreover, they griped that “[t]here was no debate about the Report, only 
the Recommendations.  But there was little basis for debate since the product was 
strictly the work of the JIS—more like an Inspector General’s report than a typical 
congressional committee report.”232 Roberts and Kyl provided numerous details of 
what they perceived to be serious defects in the Joint Inquiry process that were 
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labeled by the senators as “irregularities.” 233 These included the following: 
• “Upon instructions from the Chairmen—and in violation of 
SSCI rules—the JIS often failed to tell Members and staff of 
important non-compartmented information it discovered in 
a timely manner.”234 
• “Information relating to open hearings such as the JIS staff 
statement and witness statements—were routinely 
provided only late on the night before the hearing.”235 
• “Committee staff and sometimes even the staff directors, 
were often excluded from meetings of the “Big Four”, 
whose decisions were often made without consultation.  
Members’ liaison staff, and, therefore, the Members 
themselves, were in the dark about these decisions.”236 
A fourth key process failure noted by the joint separate statement of Senators 
Kyl and Roberts dealt with the holding of open hearings by the Joint Inquiry during 
the autumn of 2002.  As extensively explained by these gentlemen: 
The holding of open hearings was particularly frustrating.  The 
decision to hold them was apparently made by the “Big Four” despite 
the concerns of the JIS and objections of other Senators.  The JIS 
was forced to focus on them for three months, and from there had to 
go right into drafting the Report in order to meet the year-end 
deadline. 
 
Several Members voiced their opposition to holding open hearings 
before the investigative work was completed and the Report written 
(and, we had supposed agreed to).  We objected, mostly in closed 
committee business meetings, that it was premature to convene 
open hearings before the investigation was complete.  And indeed, 
at the point when the JIS began preparing for them (July, 2002), its 
investigations into the causes of 9/11 largely ground to a halt.  Due 
to dramatic media leaks and the potential for further compromise, 
intelligence agencies “pushed back” against open hearings, causing 
further friction with the JIS investigation. 
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The hearings distracted these agencies, our “front line troops” on the 
war on terrorism, and they distracted Members and congressional staff 
from our traditional oversight responsibilities.  They also, in our view … 
publicly revealed a lot of sensitive information from which our enemies 
could profit.  Most of the information presented had already been 
revealed in closed hearings which were far more productive because 
those who participated could delve freely into classified information. 
 
Key figures in our counter-terrorism efforts were unnecessarily 
compromised by these public hearings. * * *  We should have been more 
circumspect about publicly releasing results before the investigation was 
complete and the two intelligence committees had had a chance to 
adequately review the final Report.237 
2.  Claimed Deficiencies in the JIR. 
Senators Kyl and Roberts explicitly linked the previously-discussed process 
failures238, to a resulting substantive Congressional report “that falls well short of 
addressing the core problems that led to 9/11.” 239 They confidently asserted in 
support of this conclusion: “Because the fundamental problems that led to 9/11 are 
almost certainly rooted in poor policy and inadequate leadership, the investigation 
should have delved more deeply into conflicting interpretations of legal authorities 
(including presidential directives), budget allocations, institutional attitudes, and 
other key areas.” 240 As they explained in other words, “only such a thorough 
exercise will help us to make sure the failures [of American counterterrorism policy] 
are not repeated.” 241 Continuing to build on this assertion, the two senators 
observed that “[w]hat best shows the tendency of the JIS investigations to go to the 
water’s edge but no farther is that, in the Report, there is a pronounced tendency to 
identify problems as ‘facts’, or ‘realities’, rather than as matters to be plumbed for 
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underlying causes.” 242 The example provided here is staff analysis that did not dig 
for the root causes of why the CIA did not make efforts to penetrate terrorist havens 
in Afghanistan and why the Pentagon did not attempt a “comprehensive response” to  
the terrorist bombings of American embassies in Africa in 1998 or the bombing of the 
U.S.S. Cole in 2000.243 
The Additional Views of Senators Roberts and Kyl highlighted five additional 
substantive deficiencies of the Joint Inquiry Report analysis and discussion: (a) “[r]isk 
[a]version” 244, (b) “[i]nsufficient [r]esources245, (c) “[a] [f]lawed l]egal/[i]nstitutional 
 [f]ramework246, (d) “[l]eadership [f]ailures247, and (e) the “[i]nadequate [s]cope” 248 
of the JIR. 
3.  Criticism of JIR Recommendations. 
The Kyl-Roberts statement closes with two specific criticisms of the JIR 
recommendations and a general summary criticism of the failing of the JIR process.  
First, they dismissed the notion that an “intelligence czar” would be able to “succeed 
where they Director of Central Intelligence has not.” 249 Second, they objected to the 
Joint Inquiry Report’s recommendation “calling for lower-level personnel to be held 
accountable by the various agencies Inspectors General” instead of pursuing 
“[a]ccountability of those at the very top” which would, in turn, “produce[ ] 
accountability at the intervening levels, and among officers in the field who run down 
leads to find terrorists.” 250 Finally, Senators Kyl and Roberts concluded: “Our duty to 
understand precedes our ability to improve.  The [JIR] in not fully coming to terms 
50
with what produced the intelligence failures it identified, left that duty 
unfulfilled.”251 
VI.  CONGRESS AND THE ART OF OVERSIGHT OF COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY. 
A. Congress’ Constitutional Role of Executive Oversight. 
Relatively little has been written on Congress’ constitutional 
responsibility to oversee the executive branch.  Most commentators who have 
considered the subject252 have focused on the need to counterbalance the 
extraordinary power of the President and his executive branch officials in 
implementing and interpreting laws passed by Congress, the responsibility of Congress 
to assure that publicly appropriate funds are spent wisely and effectively and 
according to the intent of Congress, and the salutary effects of publicizing 
government operations in a free society.  Oversight by Congress of executive branch 
operations stems from the broad constitutional grant of “[a]ll legislative powers” to 
the Congress253 made more specific by the interconnected all-encompassing web of  
Article I Section 8 and Section 9 powers dealing with the funding and structuring of 
executive activities.254 
B.  The Lost Art of Congressional Oversight. 
While the tradition of vigorous congressional oversight of executive 
branch operations goes back in time more than 200 years255 in recent decades there 
has been an “erosion of Congress’ oversight skills” and inclination to investigate 
executive operations.256 Possible causes for this diminished effectiveness of 
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congressional oversight include the packed schedules and shorter workweeks of 
Senators and Members of Congress, term limits on chairmanships of congressional 
committees, less funds for investigative staff, the hard-work and low-payoff of 
traditional oversight by legislators, the higher priority given by legislators to 
constituent services and legislative work, and political-pressure to go easy on the 
executive branch during a time of same-party control of Congress and the White 
House, since George W. Bush became President in January 2001.257 
With regard to the combined Senate-House Joint Inquiry into the September 
11th terrorist attacks, knowledgeable observers contend that Congress has been 
“outperformed” by the National Commission on terrorist attacks.258 One 
commentator has concluded that the independent commission—turned over to 
commissioners outside of Congress: “has pried more disclosures about the 2001 
terrorist attacks” than the congressional Joint Inquiry and “generated enough public 
pressure to force national security advisor Condoleeza Rice to testify publicly, and 
Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney to brief the panel in private—all witnesses that 
the congressional” Joint Inquiry “never heard from.”259 Another observer, 
commenting on the 17 preliminary staff reports written by the independent 
commission on 9/11, noted, in implicit criticism to the congressional Joint Inquiry 
Report:
In contrast to the plodding or self-promoting style of so many 
government documents, the staff reports of the commission 
investigating the September 11, 2001 attacks have provided something 
truly rare in official Washington:  a good read. 
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In 17 crisply worded reports, the commission staff laid out facts from 
the events that shook and marred the lives of millions.  Using a style 
that is remarkably free of artifice, the authors achieved a high point in 
detail, clarity and coherence.260 
C.  Improving Congressional Oversight of Counterterrorism. 
The conventional wisdom is that because of the profound distrust 
between Republicans and Democrats in Congress there exists “political paralysis” to 
conduct effective congressional oversight of executive counterterrorism activities and 
to implement the type of structural changes needed to improve post-September 11th 
national security.261 As this line of thinking goes, until the voters decide to create 
divided government between Congress and the Presidency, nothing much will happen 
to change the culture of counterterrorism policy in the CIA, the FBI and the 
Pentagon.262 Perhaps this is correct.  But looking to the long-term, there are some 
institutional improvements that Congress should consider.   
 1.  Consolidate Intelligence Functions. 
“Jurisdiction over the various intelligence agencies and their budgets is 
currently divided among a number of committees” in both the House and the 
Senate.263 Keeping up on the oceanic flow of 21st century counterterrorism policy 
requires focus.  “If lawmakers are going to try to consolidate the government’s 
intelligence gathering operations, as they should, they can set a good example by 
taking on the turf battles within their own ranks first.”264 
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2.  Foster Intelligence Expertise. 
Under current congressional rules, individual members of the 
intelligence committees “may serve only a prescribed term.”265 This procedural 
restriction “was adopted in the 1970s to prevent lawmakers from being co-opted by 
the” executive branch’s intelligence agencies.266 In practice, however, members of 
the House and Senate are “driven from the committees just as they develop the 
necessary expertise to become … good overseer[s] of the intelligence community.”267 
As a related reform, the House and the Senate “should consider limiting the number 
of other positions that the leaders of the intelligence committees may hold to make 
sure that they have all the time needed for their responsibilities.”268 
3.  Experiment With More Decentralized and Indirect Forms of 
Intervention. 
 
While centralized statutory and budgetary changes in American 
executive branch intelligence activities and counterterrorism policies are appropriate 
(like the recent congressional acquiescence to the JIR recommendations for a 
statutory change to create a new Director of National Intelligence and the 
recommendation for a centralized all-source terrorism information fusion center 
(IFC))269 innovative congressional initiatives that complement this fundamental 
restructuring are needed to make sure that the executive branch is vigorously 
following through on new counterterrorism reforms.  The intelligence committees of 
the House and the Senate should consider drawing upon the model of “destabilization 
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rights” in public law litigation, articulated by Columbia Law professors Sabel and 
Simon, whereby plaintiffs earn judicial approval “to disentrench or unsettle a public 
institution when, first, it is failing to satisfy minimum standards of adequate 
performance and, second, it is substantially immune from conventional political 
mechanisms of correction.”270 
While counterterrorist institutional failures of key national security agencies of 
the executive branch of the federal government, like the FBI, CIA and NSA fitfully 
uncovered in the Joint Inquiry Report, are different from institutional failures of 
public schools, mental health facilities, prisons, police departments and housing 
authorities, these differences are in degree, not in kind.271 Institution building, 
maintenance, repair and improvement have been a recurrent theme of American law 
and democracy since Hart and Sacks articulated their vision of legal process 
philosophy back in the 1950s.272 As they noted, in this regard:  
[T]o help in seeing that the principle of institutional settlement 
operates not merely as a principle of necessity but as a principle of 
justice this means attention to the constant improvement of all of the 
procedures which depend upon the principle in the effort to assure that 
they yield decisions which are not merely preferable to the chaos of no 
decision but are calculated as well … to advance the larger purposes of 
society.273 
Guido Calabresi, indeed, has described the legal process school as primarily 
interested in “comparative institutional analysis”274 with new legal process legal 
theorists of the Columbia School, like Sabel and Simon, embracing “a spirit of 
Deweyen experimentalism by focusing on the development of new institutions”275 and 
55
institutional procedures. 
Just as courts in various types of public law litigation involving schools, prisons 
and the like have, with maturing experience, developed a general sense of the 
“inadequacy of command-and-control approaches”276 of highly prescriptive and 
detailed injunctive orders because they came to appreciate that “they lacked both 
the information and depth and range of control to properly formulate and enforce 
command-and-control injunctions”277, while “command-and-control interventions 
exacerbated resistance on the part of [institutional] defendants”278, so should the 
United States Congress and its intelligence committees develop a general sense of the 
inadequacy of top-down, command-and-control statutory and budgetary measures to 
alter the behavior of executive branch intelligence and counterterrorism agencies.  
With the threat of imposing a “penalty of default”279 of fundamental restructuring of 
executive branch intelligence and counterterrorism executive branch agencies or 
appropriations riders, the intelligence committees of the House and the Senate 
should seek to experiment with three specific decentralized and indirect forms of 
congressional oversight borrowed from the Sabel-Simon new legal process insights 
about recent trends in judicial supervision of public interest litigation.  First, the 
intelligence committees of Congress should seek to spur “stakeholder negotiation”280 
superintended by a special mediator, with appropriate security clearance, appointed 
by the relevant congressional committee.  Conducted with authority of an ongoing 
legislative oversight hearing, a congressional intelligence committee should mandate 
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that all relevant stakeholders from the executive branch intelligence community 
deliberate with each other (most frequently in secret closed sessions) “face to face” 
and be required to “defend their positions with reasons.”281 Intelligence committee 
imposed stakeholder negotiations should require participants “to listen to each other 
in good faith and to remain open to learning”282 and “[t]o the extent that a 
[stakeholder’s] proposals rest on factual premises, the [stakeholder] must make 
available relevant information with her control”283 without the excessive security 
blocks on sensitive information that has characterized past executive branch 
responses to congressional inquiries.  The goal of these stakeholder negotiations 
under congressional oversight imprimatur should be consensus, to be achieved 
through “openness”284 and “mutual respect”285 within the confines of the (often 
secret) negotiations.  The intelligence committees of Congress should strive to groom 
one or more of its members to develop the role as mediator between executive 
branch agencies because of the power and prestige this legislator would enjoy.  
However, a professional, non-legislator intelligence/counterterrorism mediator, 
under the control of the relevant congressional intelligence committees, might prove 
to be useful as well. 
Second, the intelligence committees of Congress should seek to instigate a 
“rolling-rule regime”286 where the norms of counterterrorism policy emerging from 
stakeholder negotiations with executive branch officials are “provisional”287,
“incorporate a process of reassessment and revision with continuing stakeholder 
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participation.”288 Stakeholders would be urged by the congressional oversight 
mediators to develop “performance measures that are as specific as possible”289,
leaving to executive branch intelligence and counterterrorism agency officials 
“substantial discretion”290, subject, however, to “precise targets.”291 In addition, 
“some processes, most often including documentation and reporting, will be specified 
in detail.”292 With continuous feedback by the congressional mediators, the 
intelligence committees of Congress should develop interim oversight reports which 
include “general descriptions of the [intelligence/counterterrorism stakeholders’] 
goals, prescriptions for measuring their progress toward them, and commitments to 
make information available.”293 Moreover, these congressional interim intelligence 
oversight reports might also include “a variety of other norms that set out, perhaps in 
great detail, practices or operations procedures”294 of executive branch agencies. 
Third, the intelligence committees of Congress should try to attain 
“transparency”295 in the executive branch intelligence and counterterrorism 
operations, which, at a minimum, insists that “the policies and operating norms of 
the rolling-rule regimes must be explicit”296 and publicly declared to Congress 
(subject to reasonable national security blocks to public access).  Transparency 
should be “both an accountability norm and a learning device”297, which is “intended 
in part to facilitate practices of disciplined comparison.”298 Congress, when armed 
with these comparative metrics—which might include private sector assessments of 
performance of counterterrorism measures299—could reward those executive branch 
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agencies which achieve good performance with autonomy and recommendations for 
requested funding.300 “As for poor performance, the trick” for Congress would be “to 
balance remedial support, loss of control, and outright punishment” of deficient 
executive branch actions.301 But legislative oversight “[e]xperimentalism does not 
provide determinate guidance on the question of sanctions.  It pins hopes largely on 
the effects of transparency”302 with a context of national security secretism.  “By 
exposing poor performance as clearly as possible, it opens the system to general 
scrutiny and exposes it more readily”303 to congressional intervention. 
 CONCLUSION 
The Joint Inquiry conducted by the intelligence committees of Congress to 
ascertain the causes of executive branch failures to anticipate and possibly prevent 
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 was deeply flawed.  Hobbled by secretism 
and obstruction by the executive branch, including the lack of cooperation by the 
President and Vice President, divided by partisan bickering within Congress, 
distracted by misguided public hearings and accompanying political grandstanding 
and weakened by poor leadership of the Senate and House intelligence committees, 
the Joint Inquiry and its work product, the Joint Inquiry Report, suffered a lack of 
credibility.  Moreover, the ineffectiveness of the Joint Inquiry on 9/11 can be 
understood as part of a steady erosion in recent decades of the art of congressional 
oversight of the executive branch of the federal government. 
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Congress could help to rectify its lackluster performance of executive branch 
oversight, in general, and improve its oversight of executive agency counterterrorism 
performance, in particular, by considering three pragmatic internal congressional 
reforms304: (1) consolidating intelligence review functions into the intelligence 
committees; (2) fostering intelligence expertise of Senate and House intelligence  
committee members; and (3) experimentation with more decentralized and indirect 
forms of intervention by creating intelligence mediators who would be responsible to 
Congress and who would seek to spur (a) stakeholder negotiation; (b) a rolling rule 
regime of norms for counterterrorism performance and practice, and (c) transparency 
in executive branch intelligence and counterterrorism operations, subject to 
reasonable secrecy required by legitimate national security considerations. 
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Actionable Intelligence:
Intelligence information that is directly useful to customers for immediate 
exploration without having to go through the full intelligence production process; it 
may address strategic or tactical needs, close support of US negotiating teams, or 
action elements dealing with such matters as international terrorism or narcotics. 
 
Id. at 424. 
 
Asset:
(1)  Any resource—a person, group, relationship, instrument, installation, supply—at 
the disposition of an intelligence agency for use in an operational or support role.  
(2) A person who contributes to a clandestine mission but is not a fully controlled 
agent. 
 
Id.  
 
Clandestine Operation:
A preplanned secret intelligence collection activity or covert political, economic, 
propaganda, or paramilitary action conducted so as to assure the secrecy of the 
operation; encompasses both clandestine collection and covert nation. 
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Id. at 425. 
 
Classification:
The determination that official information requires, in the interest of national 
security, a specific degree of protection against unauthorized disclosure, coupled 
with a designation signifying that such a determination has been made; the 
designation is normally termed a security classification and includes Confidential, 
Secret, and Top Secret. 
 
Id.  
Counterintelligence:
Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other 
intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of 
foreign powers, organizations, persons, or terrorist activities, but not including 
personnel, physical, document, or communication security programs. 
 
Id.
Counterterrorism:
Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to a terrorist act or the 
documented threat of such an act. 
 
Id.at 425-26. 
 
Domestic Collection:
The acquisition of foreign intelligence information within the United States from 
governmental or nongovernmental organizations or individuals who are willing sources 
and chose to cooperate by sharing such information. 
 
Id. at 427. 
 
IC:
Intelligence Community—the aggregate of the following executive branch organizations 
and agencies involved in intelligence activities: the Central Intelligence Agency; the 
National Security Agency; the Defense Intelligence Agency; offices within the 
Department of Defense for the collection of specialized reconnaissance programs; the 
Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State; intelligence elements 
of the military services, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of 
Treasury, and the Department of Energy; and staff elements of the office of the 
Director of Central Intelligence. 
 
Id. at 428-29. 
 
International Terrorism:
Terrorist acts that transcend national boundaries in their conduct or purpose, the 
nationalities of the victims, or the resolution of the incident.  Such an act is usually 
designed to attract wide publicity to focus attention on the existence, cause, or 
demands of the perpetration. 
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Id. at 429-30. 
 
PDB:
President’s Daily Brief (prepared by CIA for President and very small number of other 
senior officials)[.] 
 
Id. at 431. 
 
52 Id. at 434. 
 
53 Id. at 435. 
 
54 Id. (consisting of separately paginated additional views of Sen. Richard C. Shelby, Rep. Michael N. 
Castle, Sen. Mike DeWine, Rep. Jane Harman, Sen. John Kyl, and Sen. Pat Roberts, Sen. Carl Levin, Sen. 
Barbara Mikulski, Rep. Jim Roemer). 
 
55 Id.  The list of appendices to the JIR includes the following: 
 
• Initial Scope of Joint Inquiry. 
• Supplemental Joint Inquiry Rules. 
• Joint Inquiry Hearings. 
• List of Persons Interviewed. 
• Counterterrorism Organizations Within the Intelligence Community. 
• Evolution of the Terrorist Threat and the U.S. Response, 1983-2001. 
• Selected Events in the Chronology of Terrorism, 1982-2001. 
• CIA/FBI Failures in Regard to Two September 11 Hijackers, The Phoenix Electronic 
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• Moussaoui Related FBI Field Agent Notes and Field Office/Headquarters E-mails. 
• General Accounting Office: Analysis of U.S. Anthrax Attacks. 
• CTC Watchlisting Guidance—December 1999. 
• The Joint Inquiry in Court. 
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“U.S. institutional responses to terrorism”, although a considerable portion of the content is deleted by 
brackets and strikethroughs.  Third, the Appendix-Selected Events in the Chronology of Terrorism, 1982-
2001 offers a striking visual timeline of the following types of information: terrorist incident, 
information indicating terrorist activity or intentions to strike inside the United States, information 
indicating terrorist activity or intentions to use airplanes as weapons, and communications intercepts 
suggesting possible imminent terrorist activities.  Fourth, the Appendix Joint Inquiry in Court details 
the tripartite branch processes of the executive, legislative and judicial branches surrounding the 
investigation and litigation involving Zacarias Moussaoui—the suspected “20th hijacker” on 9/11.  Legal 
counsel from the congressional offices of Senate Legal Counsel, House General Counsel, and General 
Counsel of the Joint Inquiry were involved in contesting a DOJ-sought judicial protective order in the 
Moussaoui case.  According to this Appendix: 
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With the assistance of the Offices of Senate Legal Counsel and House General Counsel, 
the General Counsel of the Joint Inquiry … participated in the argument on August 29, 
2002.  The reply asked the District Court to deny the DOJ’s requested relief for three 
main reasons: (1) the protective order does not govern testimony before Congress, nor 
does it govern the production of documents to Congress, the use of documents by it, or 
the issuance of its reports; (2) Local Criminal Rule 57 specifically does not preclude the 
holding of legislative hearings or the issuance of legislative reports, and (3) the 
proposed expansion of the [protective] order by the Department of Justice runs afoul of 
the separation of powers. 
 
Id., Appendix Joint Inquiry in Court at 3.  The DOJ lost its motion to expand the scope of the Moussaoui 
judicial protective order to cover the Joint Inquiry legislative proceedings.  Id. at 4-5.  Yet, the 
following novel procedure was allowed by the Joint Inquiry: 
 
In accordance with its commitment to consult with the Department of Justice, the Joint 
Inquiry continued to allow DOJ to review and comment regarding the contents of staff 
statements related to the Moussaoui case and other matters.  At the Joint Inquiry’s 
September 24 [2002] public hearing that followed concerning the Moussaoui matter, the 
Joint Inquiry permitted a DOJ representative to attend with FBI witnesses for the 
purpose of advising whether any question called for an answer that might impair the 
Moussaoui prosecution.  Thus, the Inquiry was able to proceed with a full public 
exposition of the issues raised in the Moussaoui investigation without impeding the due 
process and fair interests of Moussaoui and the DOJ. 
 
Id. at 5. 
 
56 Factual finding of the JIR states: 
 
While the Intelligence Community had amassed a great deal of valuable intelligence 
regarding Usama Bin Ladin and his terrorist activities, none of it identified the time, 
place, and specific nature of the attacks that were planned for September 11, 2001.  
Nonetheless, the Community did have information that was clearly relevant to the 
September 11 attacks, particularly when considered for its collective significance. 
 
Id. at xi. 
 
57 Factual finding of the JIR states: 
 
During the spring and summer of 2001, the Intelligence Community experienced a 
significant increase in information indicating that Bin Ladin and al-Qa’ida intended to 
strike against U.S. interests in the very near future. 
 
Id. 
 
58 Factual finding of the JIR states: 
 
Beginning in 1998 and continuing into the summer of 2001, the Intelligence Community 
received a modest, but relatively steady, stream of intelligence reporting that 
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indicated the possibility of terrorist attacks within the United States.  Nonetheless, 
testimony and interviews confirm that it was the general view of the Intelligence 
Community, in the spring and summer of 2001, that the threatened Bin Ladin attacks 
would most likely occur against U.S. interests overseas, despite indications of plans and 
intentions to attack in the domestic United States. 
 
Id.  
 
59 Factual finding 4 of the JIR states: 
 
From at least 1994, and continuing into the summer of 2001, the Intelligence 
Community received information indicating that terrorists were contemplating, among 
other means of attack, the use of aircraft as weapons.  This information did not 
stimulate any specific Intelligence Community assessment of, or collective U.S. 
Government reaction to, this form of threat. 
 
Id.  
 
60 Factual finding number 5 of the JIR consists of an overarching finding and, then, ten sub-findings 
numbered 5a through 5j, inclusive.  Overarching finding number 5 states: 
 
Although relevant information that is significant in retrospect regarding the attacks was 
available to the Intelligence Community prior to September 11, 2001, the Community 
too often failed to focus on that information and consider and appreciate its collective 
significance in terms of a probable terrorist attack.  Neither did the Intelligence 
Community demonstrate sufficient initiative in coming to grips with the new 
transnational threats.  Some significant pieces of information in the vast stream of data 
being collected were overlooked, some were not recognized as potentially significant at 
the time and therefore not disseminated, and some required additional action on the 
part of foreign governments before a direct connection to the hijackers could have 
been established.  For all these reasons, the Intelligence Community failed to fully 
capitalize on available, and potentially important, information. 
 
Id.   Five of the sub-findings relate to the forest from the trees problem: sub-finding 5a concerning 
“[t]errorist [c]ommunications in 1999” about persons who, after September 11, 2001, were connected 
with the terrorist attacks of that day, id. at (JIR brackets omitted) sub-finding 5b concerning “Malaysia 
[m]eeting and [t]ravel of al-Qaida [o]peratives to the United States” regarding a 2000 rendezvous 
between two individuals who had a key role in the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, id.; and sub-
finding 5c dealing with [t]errorist [c]ommunications in [s]pring 2000 regarding known communication 
involving an individual who had attended the Malaysia meeting, id.(JIR brackets omitted) sub-finding 5g 
concerning “[h]ijackers in [c]ontact [w]ith [p]ersons of FBI [i]nvestigative [i]nterest in the United 
States,” id. at xiv; and sub-finding 5h concerning the CIA’s awareness, but missed opportunities, of the 
[h]ijackers’ [a]ssociation in Germany.”  Id. (JIR brackets omitted).   
 
61 Related finding 17 of the JIR, id. at xvii. 
 
62 Related finding 19 of the JIR, id. at xix. 
 
63 Conclusion-factual findings of the JIR, id. at xv (emphasis added). 
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64 Systemic finding 1, id. 
 
65 Factual sub-finding 5d, id. at xii. 
 
66 Systemic finding 9 of the JIR states: 
 
The U.S. Government does not presently bring together in one place all terrorism-
related information from all sources.  While the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center does 
manage overseas operations and has access to most Intelligence Community 
information, it does not collect terrorism-related information from all sources, 
domestic and foreign.  Within the Intelligence Community, agencies did not adequately 
share relevant counterterrorism information, prior to September 11.  This breakdown in 
communications was the result of a number of factors, including differences in the 
agencies’ missions, legal authorities and cultures.  Information was not sufficiently 
shared, not only between different Intelligence Community agencies, but also within 
individual agencies, and between the intelligence and the law enforcement agencies. 
 
Id. at xvii (emphasis added). 
 
67 Systemic finding 10 of the JIR provides: 
 
Serious problems in information sharing also persisted prior to September 11, between 
the Intelligence Community and relevant non-Intelligence Community agencies.  This 
included other federal agencies as well as state and local authorities.  This lack of 
communication and collaboration deprived those other entities, as well as the 
Intelligence Community, of access to potentially valuable information in the “war” 
against Bin Ladin.  The Inquiry’s focus on the Intelligence Community limited the 
extent to which it explored these issues, and this is an area that should be reviewed 
further.   
Id. (emphasis added). 
 
68 For an updated version see JAMES FINN GARDNER, POLITICALLY CORRECT BEDTIME STORIES 57-62 (1994). 
69 Factual sub-finding 5e, JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at xii.  For a journalistic account of the 
FBI and international terrorism leading up to the events of 9/11 see generally PETER LANCE, 1000 YEARS 
FOR REVENGE: INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND THE FBI—THE UNTOLD STORY (2003). 
 
In the discussion supporting factual sub-finding 5e, the JIR suggests that the problem was, at 
bottom, a resource issue.  Before the Joint Inquiry, the Phoenix agent who authored the Phoenix 
communication testified that:  
 
“What I wanted was an analytical product.  I wanted this discussed with the 
Intelligence Community.  I wanted to see if my hunches were correct.  He noted, 
however, that he also knew this type of analytical product took a back seat to 
operational matters at the FBI: 
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But, I am also a realist.  I understand that the people at FBI Headquarters 
are terribly overworked and understaffed, and they have been for years.  
And at the time that I am … sending this in, having worked this stuff for 13 
years, and watched the unit in action over the years, I knew that this was 
going to be at the bottom of the pile, so to speak, because they were 
dealing with real-time threats, real-time issues trying to render fugitives 
back to the United States from overseas for justice.  And again, it is a 
resource issue.   
 
The Phoenix agent was correct, and his communication did fall to the bottom of the 
pile. * * * 
 
JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at 20-21. 
 
70 Bud Abbott and Lou Costello, Who’s On First?, performed in THE NAUGHTY NINETIES (1945). 
 
71 Factual sub-finding 5f, JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at xiii.  The sub-finding provides: 
 
In August 2001, the FBI’s Minneapolis field office, in conjunction with the INS 
[Immigration and Naturalization Service], detained Zacarias Massouri, a French national 
who had enrolled in flight training in Minnesota.  FBI agents there also suspected that 
Moussaoui was involved in a hijacking plot.  FBI Headquarters determined that there 
was not probable cause to obtain a court order to search Moussaoui’s belongings under 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).  However, personnel at FBI 
Headquarters, including the Radical Fundamentalism Unit and the National Security Law 
Unit, as well as agents in the Minneapolis field office, misunderstood the legal 
standards for obtaining an order under FISA.  As a result, FBI Minneapolis field office 
personnel wasted valuable investigative resources trying to connect the Chechen rebels 
to al-Qa’ida.  Finally, no one at the FBI apparently connected Moussaoui investigation 
with the heightened threat environment in the summer of 2001, the Phoenix 
communication, or the entry of al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi into the United States. 
 
Id.  
 
72 Factual sub-heading 5i, id. at xiv.  The sub-finding states: 
 
Prior to September 11, the Intelligence Community had information linking Khalid 
Shaykh Mohammed (KSM), now recognized by the Intelligence Community as the 
mastermind of the attacks to Bin Ladin, to terrorist plans to use an aircraft as weapons, 
and to terrorist activity in the United States.  The Intelligence Community, however, 
relegated … KSM to rendition target status following his 1996 indictment in connection 
with the Bojinka Plot and, as a result, focused primarily on his location, rather than his 
activities and place in the al-Qa’ida hierarchy.  The Community also did not recognize 
the significance of reporting in June 2001 concerning KSM’s active role in sending 
terrorists to the United States, or the facilitation of their activities upon arriving in the 
United States.  Collection efforts were not targeted on information about KSM that 
might have helped better understand al-Qa’ida’s plans and intentions and KSM’s role in 
the September 11 attacks was a surprise to the Intelligence Community. 
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Id.  
 
73 Factual sub-finding 5j, id. at xv.  The sub-finding provides: 
 
In the period from September 8 to September 10, 2001, NSA intercepted, but did not 
translate or disseminate until after September 11, some communications that indicated 
possible impending terrorist activity.   
 
Id. (brackets omitted).  The discussion supporting sub-finding 5j is largely deleted or bracketed.  Id. at 
32.  
 
74 Id. at xvi. 
 
75 Id. at 39. 
 
76 Id. 
 
77 Id. at 41(original emphasis). 
 
78 Id. at xvi. 
 
79 Id. at 68.   
 
80 JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at xvii.  The discussion in support of this systemic finding 
mentions a lack of basic skills by NSA personnel, “frustration regarding their current working 
environment”, and “a high level of frustration among contractors who do business with the NSA.”  
Id. at 76-7. 
 
81 Id. at xvii.  The discussion in support of this systemic finding has been sanitized by substantial 
deletion of national security sensitive information.  See id. at 90-96. 
 
82 See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
 
83 JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at xviii.  The discussion in support of this systemic finding is 
mostly uninformative because of the substantial deletion of national security sensitive information.  
See id. at 109-13. 
 
84 Id. (brackets omitted).  As one would expect in a situation where even the systemic finding, itself, 
was subject to revision on grounds of national security, the discussion supporting this finding is likewise 
sanitized.  See id. at 113-17. 
 
85 JERRY MCGUIRE (Jerry McGuire Productions 1996). 
 
86 JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at xvi.  Systemic finding 3 states: 
 
Between the end of the Cold War and September 11, 2001, overall Intelligence 
Community funding fell or remained even in constant dollars, while funding for the 
Community’s counterterrorism efforts increased considerably.  Despite these increases, 
the accumulation of intelligence priorities, a burdensome requirement process, the 
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overall decline in Intelligence Community funding, and reliance on supplemental 
appropriations made it difficult to allocate Community resources effectively against an 
evolving terrorist threat.  Inefficiencies in the resource and requirements process were 
compounded by problems in Intelligence Community budgeting practices and 
procedures. 
 
Id. 
 
87 Id. at 46 (brackets omitted). 
 
88 Id. at xvi. 
 
89 Id. at 70. 
 
90 Dueling Banjos (from the Movie DELIVERANCE Soundtrack 1973). 
 
91 JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at xvi.  Systemic finding 7, in sanitized language, provides: 
 
Prior to September 11, the Intelligence Community’s ability to produce significant and 
timely signals intelligence on counterterrorism was limited by NSA’s conflict between 
Intelligence Community agencies, NSA’s cautious approach to any collection of 
intelligence relating to activities in the United States, and insufficient collaboration 
between NSA and FBI regarding the potential for terrorist attacks within the United 
States. 
 
Id. (brackets omitted). 
 
92 Id. at 74-5 (brackets omitted). 
 
93 Id. at 75 (brackets omitted). 
 
94 Id. (brackets omitted). 
 
95 Systemic finding 14, edited for reasons of national security, states: 
 
Senior U.S. military officials were reluctant to use U.S. military assets to conduct 
offensive counter-terrorism efforts in Afghanistan, or to support or participate in CIA 
operations directed against al-Qa’ida prior to September 11.  At least part of this 
reluctance was driven by the military’s view that the Intelligence Community was 
unable to provide the intelligence needed to support military operations.  Although the 
U.S. military did participate in [ ---- ] counterterrorism efforts to counter Usama Bin 
Ladin’s terrorist network prior to September 11, 2001, most of military’s focus was on 
force protection. 
 
Id. at xviii (brackets omitted). 
 
96 Id. at 107.  
 
97 Id. at 106. 
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98 Id. 
 
99 These included cruise missile attacks against Bin Ladin on August 20, 1998, “following the bombings 
of two U.S. embassies in East Africa”, id. at 108, (brackets omitted); positioning of U.S. naval vessels in 
the North Arabian Sea between 1999 and 2001 “to launch additional cruise missile strikes at Bin Ladin in 
the event the Intelligence Community was able to obtain precise information on his whereabouts in 
Afghanistan”, id. (brackets omitted); and military assistance “in the development of the Predator 
unmanned aerial vehicle as a second source of intelligence on Usama Bin Ladin’s precise whereabouts in 
Afghanistan.”  Id. (brackets omitted). 
 
100 1 COR. 13:12 states:  “For now we see through a glass, darkly; but then face-to-face; now I know, in 
part, then shall I know even as also I am known.” 
 
101 JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at xvii. 
 
102 Id. at 96-97. 
 
103 My sense of using the term “good cop, bad cop” differs a bit from its typical use as “a psychological 
tactic, often used by police for interrogation”.  Thus: 
 
Two ‘cops’ alternate their interviews.  The ‘Bad Cop’ behaves negatively toward the 
subject, making blatant accusations, derogatory comments, threats, and in general 
raising the subject’s antipathy.  This sets the stage for the ‘Good Cop’ to deceptively 
act supportive, understanding, defensive, and in general show sympathy for the 
subject, which may make the subject cooperative towards the latter. 
 
http://www.webster-dictionary.org/definition/Good%20cop%Fbad%20cop. 
104 JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at xviii-xix (emphasis added). 
 
105 Id. at 120. 
 
106 Id. at 121 (brackets omitted).  Tellingly, there is a bracketed and deleted two and a half sentence 
set forth in the JIR after the quoted sentence in the text—presumably a detailed assessment of specific 
executive branch failings to support the topic sentence of the paragraph—excised by national security 
censors. 
 
107 Id. 
 
108 Id. at 123 (brackets omitted in last two sentences). 
 
109 JOSEPH HELLER, CATCH-22 (1961). 
 
110 See generally, THE OXFORD COMPANION TO ENGLISH LITERATURE 176-77 (Margaret Drabble, ed., 5th ed. 
1985). 
 
111 JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at xvii-xviii. 
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112 Id. at 98 (Brackets omitted). 
 
113 Id. at 98-99 (brackets omitted). 
 
114 Id. at 99. 
 
115 As of April of 2004, Richard Clarke’s exposé book on pre-9/11 events was a national bestseller.  See 
RICHARD CLARKE, AGAINST ALL ENEMIES (2004). 
 
116 JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at 100 (emphasis added). 
 
117 Id. at xix.  The language of finding 20 in the summary findings simply states: “Located in Part Four 
entitled “Finding, Discussion and Narrative Regarding Certain Sensitive National Security Matters.”  Id.  
A sanitized, expanded version of finding 20 is found buried at the end of the report.  Id. at 395. 
 
118 Id. at 296-422.  Isolated, unhelpful words and phrases are sprinkled throughout these pages.  See 
e.g. id. at 406 (“The Joint Inquiry also found”), id. at 413 (“In testimony before the Joint Inquiry”), id. 
at 416 (“Finally”).  Why did Congress bother to insert these inane phrases amid a sea of deleted pages? 
 
119 Id. at 395 (brackets omitted). 
 
120 Id. (brackets omitted). 
 
121 Id. (brackets omitted). 
 
122 See generally, LANCE, supra note 69.  Cf. BOB GRAHAM, INTELLIGENCE MATTERS: THE CIA, THE FBI, SAUDI 
ARABIA AND THE FAILURE OF AMERICA’S WAR ON TERROR 168-69, 202, 216, 225, 229, 237 (2004)(arguing financial 
support of Saudi Arabia for terrorists). 
 
123 JOINT INQUIRY ERRATA PRINT, supra note 26, at 1.  Sloppiness is further apparent in the ERRATA print’s 
footnoted reference to a “[l]ist of previous commissions that addressed intelligence organizational 
issues, 1990-present” and its omission of these commissions from both the original JIR and the ERRATA 
print.  Perhaps, the footnote is a sloppy reference to the “Appendix-Evolution of the Terrorist Threat 
and the U.N. Response, 1983-2001”, JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at App. 5-49. 
 
124 Id. at 2. 
 
125 Id. at 3. 
 
126 Id. at 2 (footnote omitted). 
 
127 Id. 
 
128 Id.  
 
129 Id. 
 
130 Id. at 3.  
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131 Id.  
132 Id. 
 
133 Id.  
134 Id. 
 
135 Id. at 5 (emphasis added). 
 
136 Id. 
 
137 According to the JIR, the “information fusion center” (IFC) should be given legal authority and 
resources needed to: 
 
– have full and timely access to all counterterrorism-related intelligence information, 
including “raw” supporting data as needed; 
– have the ability to participate fully in the existing requirements process for tasking 
the Intelligence Community to gather information on foreign individuals, entities 
and threats; 
– integrate such information in order to identify and assess the nature and scope of 
terrorist threats to the United States in light of actual and potential vulnerabilities; 
– implement and fully utilize data mining and other advanced analytical tools, 
consistent with applicable law; 
– retain a permanent staff of experienced and highly skilled analysts, supplemented 
on a regular basis by personnel on “joint tours” from the various Intelligence 
Community agencies; 
– institute a reporting mechanism that enables analysts at all the intelligence and 
law enforcement agencies without waiting for dissemination of a formal report; 
– maintain excellence and creativity in staff analytic skills through regular use of 
analysis and language training programs; and  
– establish and sustain effective channels for the exchange of counterterrorism-
related information with federal agencies outside the Intelligence Community as 
well as with state and local authorities. 
 
Id. at 5-6. 
 
138 Id. at 9-10. 
 
139 See supra notes 124-37 and accompanying text. 
 
140 JOINT INQUIRY ERRATA PRINT, supra note 26, at 11. 
 
141 Id.  The JIR recommendation continues by stating: 
 
The Director of National Intelligence should require more extensive use of “joint tours” 
for intelligence and appropriate law enforcement personnel to broaden their 
experience and help bridge existing organizational and cultural divides through service 
in other agencies.  These joint tours should include not only service at Intelligence 
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Community agencies, but also service in those agencies that are users or consumers of 
intelligence products.  Serious incentives for joint services should be established 
throughout the Intelligence Community and personnel should be rewarded for joint 
service with career advancement credit at individual agencies.  The Director of 
National Intelligence should also require Intelligence Community agencies to participate 
in joint exercises[.] 
 
Id. at 11-12. 
 
142 Id. at 12. 
 
143 Id. at 14. 
 
144 Id. 
 
145 Id. at 15. 
 
146 GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1948). 
 
147 See Ian Fleming’s classic book, GOLDFINGER (1959). 
 
148 JOINT INQUIRY ERRATA PRINT, supra note 26, at 3-4. 
 
149 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
 
150 See id., art. II, § 2, cls. 4-5. 
 
151 See id., art. I, § 9, cl. 7. 
 
152 JOINT INQUIRY ERRATA PRINT, supra note 26, at 4. 
 
153 Id. at 8.  The JIR goes on to request, by way of a prominent example, executive branch proposals 
on “whether the range of persons subject to searches and surveillances authorized under the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) should be expanded.”  Id. 
 
154 Id.  Comparative law perspectives are usually helpful in pondering the content and structure of 
legislation.  But query: have the domestic intelligence problems of the United States—the world’s sole 
“super-power” with the enmity of many groups from around the world—become sui generis? Perhaps 
the experience of Israel in conducting its domestic intelligence would be most apropos to the domestic 
intelligence program needed for the United States in the post 9/11 era. 
 
155 Id. at 9. 
 
156 Id. 
 
157 Id. at 10. 
 
158 Id.  The language used by the JIR is ambiguous and open to varying interpretations.  As a final shot 
over the bow of NSA, the JIR in conjunction with the forthcoming requested report from NSA indicates 
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as follows: “In evaluating the plan, the Committees should also consider issues pertaining to whether 
civilians should be appointed to the position of Director of National Security Agency and whether the 
term of service for the position should be longer than it has been in the recent past.”  Id. 
 
159 Id. at 13.  Interestingly, the JIR wants the State Department review to “address the degree to 
which current categories of extraditable offenses should be expanded to cover offenses, such as visa 
and immigration fraud, which may be particularly useful against terrorists and those who support 
them.”  Id. 
 
160 See generally JOHN W. DEAN, WORSE THAN WATERGATE 113-14 (2004) (“Because of the lack of White 
House cooperation with the joint inquiry, the families of 9/11 victims began lobbying Congress to 
create an independent commission, with subpoena power, to investigate 9/11, even before the 
congressional effort had been completed”).  Of course, the Joint Inquiry, acting through the respective 
houses of Congress, could have subpoenaed all pertinent documents that it wanted from the executive 
branch.  See generally LEGISLATIVE PROCESS (Abner J. Mikva & Eric Lane, eds. 2nd ed. 2002) 216-30 
(discussing compulsory process before congressional committees). 
 
161 JOINT INQUIRY ERRATA PRINT, supra note 26, at 13.  In July of 2004 the commission issued its report.  
See supra note 8 and accompanying text. This report “concluded in its unanimous final report … that 
the attacks were a shock but they should not have come as a surprise.”  Philip Shenon, ‘We Are Not 
Safe’: Commission Warns of Another Catastrophe Under Status Quo, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2004, at A1 
(internal quotiation marks omitted).  For an account of the formation of the Commission because of the 
perceived lack of success of the Joint Inquiry by Congress see CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY INC., 2002 ALMANAC 
7-18-7-19 (2003). 
 
162 Id. at 14.  JOINT INQUIRY ERRATA PRINT, supra note 26, at 14. 
 
163 DEAN, supra note 160, at 113. 
 
164 JOINT INQUIRY ERRATA PRINT, supra note 26, at 15 (emphasis added). 
 
165 Id.  
166 Id. at 16.  In what may be called an omnibus reporting mandate, the following language appears at 
the close of the JIR recommendations: “The Intelligence Community should fully inform the House and 
Senate Intelligence Committees of significant developments [regarding evidence of state sponsored 
terrorism], through regular reports and additional communications” with the expectation that “the 
[congressional] Committees should, in turn, exercise vigorous and continuing oversight of the 
[Intelligence] Community’s work in this critically important area.”  Id. at 17. 
 
167 Id. at 4.  The JIR goes on to specify how Congress would like this national counterterrorism strategy 
to look including discussion of the following: 
 
– develop[ing] human sources to penetrate terrorist organizations and networks both 
overseas and within the United States; 
– fully utilize[ing] existing and future technologies to better exploit terrorist 
communications; to improve and expand the use of data mining and other cutting 
edge analytical tools; and to develop a multi-level security capability to facilitate 
the timely and complete sharing of relevant intelligence information both within 
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the Intelligence Community and with other appropriate federal, state, and local 
authorities; 
– enhance[ing] the depth and quality of domestic intelligence collection and analysis 
by, for example, modernizing current intelligence reporting formats through the 
use of existing information technology to emphasize the existence and the 
significance of links between new and previously acquired information; 
– maximize[ing] the effective use of covert action in counterterrorist efforts; 
– develop[ing] programs to deal with financial support for international terrorism; 
and  
– facilitate[ing] the ability of CIA paramilitary units and military special operations to 
conduct joint operations against terrorist targets. 
Id. at 4-5. 
 
168 Id. at 5. 
 
169 Id. at 7-8. 
 
170 Id. at 9. 
 
171 Id. at 10. 
 
172 Id. at 11.  One of the more intriguing specific congressional recommendations is a “Civilian Linguist 
Reserve Corps” outside of the Intelligence Community “whose abilities are relevant to the needs of 
counterterrorism[.]”  Moreover, ever “politically correct” in its aspirations, the JIR directs that: 
 
the Intelligence Community should enhance recruitment of a more ethnically and 
culturally diverse workforce and devise a strategy to capitalize upon the unique culture 
and linguistic capabilities of first-generation Americans, a strategy designed to utilize 
their skills to the greatest practical effect, while recognizing the potential 
counterintelligence challenges such hiring decisions might pose. 
 
Id. at 12. 
 
173 Id. at 12-13. 
 
174 Id. at 14. 
 
175 Id. at 15-16. 
 
176 Id. at 16. 
 
177 Id. 
 
178 See JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, following page 435.  The “additional views” are separately 
paginated.  Citation will be to the JOINT INQUIRY REPORT followed by a parenthetical reference to the 
congressional member filing the additional views and a page reference to the member’s separate 
pagination.  For example, id. (Additional Views of Sen. Richard C. Shelby at 7). 
 
179 See e.g. MIKVA & LANE, supra note 160, at 284-85. 
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180 Cf. Robert F. Blomquist, Dissent, Posner-Style: Judge Richard A. Posner’s First Decade Dissenting 
Judicial Opinions, 1981-1991—Toward An Aesthetics of Judicial Dissenting Style, 69 MO. L. REV. 73 
(2004).  See also CASS SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT (2003). 
 
181 The additional views of members are as follows and appear in the following order: 
 
– Sen. Richard C. Shelby (R-AL) (135 pages) 
– Rep. Michael N. Castle (R-DE) (2 pages) 
– Sen. Mike DeWine (R-OH) (16 pages) 
– Rep. Jane Harman (D-CA) (5 pages) 
– Sen. John Kyl (R-AZ) and Sen. Pat Roberts (R-KS) (21 pages) 
– Sen. Carl Levin (D-MN) (3 pages) 
– Sen. Barbara A. Mikulski (D-MD) (3 pages) 
– Rep. Tim Roemer (D-IN) (5 pages) 
 
A total of 17 U.S. Senators and members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence were part of 
the JOINT INQUIRY. A total of 20 U.S. Representatives and members of the House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, were part of the Joint Inquiry.  Therefore, 9 out of 37 (or about 24%) of the 
Joint Inquiry members filed additional views. 
 
182 See JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, at viii. 
 
183 See supra note 181 and accompanying text. 
 
184 DEAN, supra note 160, at 113 (footnote omitted). 
 
185 JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7, (Additional Views of Sen. Richard C. Shelby at 3). 
 
186 Id. (Additional Views of Sen. Richard C. Shelby at 4).  In partial support of his reference to 
centrifugal tendencies, Shelby observed: “The most obvious problem with respect to the IC’s 
[Intelligence Committee’s] ability to act as a coherent and effective whole is the fact that more than 
80 percent of its budgets and personnel resources are controlled by the Department of Defense (DOD).” 
 Id. (Additional Views of Sen. Richard C. Shelby at 21). 
 
187 Id.  (Additional Views of Sen. Richard C. Shelby at 28).  He elaborated in this point by observing:  
 
This is what might be called the “meta-lesson” of our current round of “lessons 
learned” studies of intelligence failures: we must not only learn the lessons of the past 
but learn how to keep learning lessons as we change and adapt in the future.  Adopting 
uniform personnel standards would help the Community ensure that its personnel and 
organizational units remain unique and valuable individual resources but they would 
also become administratively fungible assets, capable of being reorganized and 
redirected efficiently as circumstances demand. 
 
Id. (original emphasis). 
 
188 Id. (Additional Views of Sen. Richard C. Shelby at 29). 
 
81
189 Id. (Additional Views of Sen. Richard C. Shelby at 33-46). 
 
190 Id. (Additional Views of Sen. Richard C. Shelby at 47-51). 
 
191 Id. (Additional Views of Sen. Richard C. Shelby at 52-70). 
 
192 Id. (Additional Views of Sen. Richard C. Shelby at 6-7). 
 
193 Id. (Additional Views of Sen. Richard C. Shelby at 8). 
 
194 Pub. L. 107-56 (Oct. 26, 2001). 
 
195 18 U.S.C. § 1801, et. seq. 
 
196 JOINT INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 7 (Additional Views of Sen. Richard C. Shelby at 86). 
 
197 Id. (Additional Views of Sen. Richard C. Shelby at 89) (original emphasis) (footnote omitted). 
 
198 Id.  (Additional Views of Sen. Richard C. Shelby at 10).  He went on to contend: 
 
In light of the FBI’s dismal recent history of disorganization and institutional 
incompetence in its national security work, many of us in Congress have begun to 
consider whether it might better serve the interests of the American people to separate 
the counterintelligence and counterterrorism functions of the [FBI] into an entirely 
separate organization—one that would be free of the structural, organizational, and 
cultural constraints that have greatly handicapped the FBI’s ability to conduct the 
domestic intelligence work our country depends upon it to perform. 
 
Id.  (Additional Views of Sen. Richard C. Shelby at 98-99). 
 
199 Id. (Additional Views of Sen. Richard C. Shelby at 12). 
 
200 Id.  (Additional Views of Sen. Richard C. Shelby at 129).  A significant reason for this covert action 
timidity, from Shelby’s perspective, was a history, during the Clinton Administration, of legal 
authorizations contained in presidential Memoranda of Notifications (MONs) “as to what [covert] agents 
are permitted to do in pursuit of the stated aim—with absolute clarity.”  Id. (footnote citing Joint 
Inquiry testimony of former National Security Advisor Sandy Berger). 
 
201 Id.  
 
202 Id. (Additional Views of Sen. Richard C. Shelby at 13) (original emphasis). 
 
203 Id. (original emphasis). 
 
204 Id. (Additional Views of Rep. Mike Castle at 1). 
 
205 Id. 
 
206 Id. (Additional Views of Rep. Mike Castle at 1-2). 
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207 Id. (Additional Views of Sen. Mike DeWine at 2).  Cf. Blomquist, supra note 180, at 91-2 (discussing 
the concept of a collaborative versus an oppositional judicial dissenting opinion). 
 
208 JOINT INQUIRY REPORT supra note 7 (additional views of Sen. Mike DeWine at 2). 
 
209 Id. Senator DeWine’s suggestions for additional congressional oversight activities are incisive and 
perspicacious.  He proposes, for example:   
 
[T]he Intelligence Committees [of Congress] should hold regularly scheduled hearings to 
examine the FISA process and receive testimony from senior [executive branch] officials 
….  These hearings should explore the FISA process and provide information as to how 
FISA is being implemented.  For example, in order to better determine how the 
Executive Branch is utilizing FISA, the Committee should examine the number of FISA 
warrants issued during a given period of time and the general subject matter or issues 
those warrants were meant to address.  Furthermore, these hearings should be used to 
explore a wide range of hypothetical situations—situations based on actual cases that 
demonstrate to [Congress] … how the law would be applied in certain scenarios.  This 
would allow [Congress] to develop a better understanding of how FISA is being 
implemented in a practical, day-to-day manner and also alert [Congress] to any 
instances where the [relevant intelligence entities are] departing from Congressional 
intent. 
 
Id.  (Additional Views of Sen. Mike DeWine at 3). 
 
210 Id. (Additional Views of Sen. Mike DeWine at 4). 
 
211 Id. (Additional Views of Sen. Mike DeWine at 4, n. 2). 
 
212 Id. (Additional Views of Sen. Mike DeWine at 5). 
 
213 Id. (Additional Views of Sen. Mike DeWine at 6). 
 
214 Id. 
 
215 Id.  An obvious potential problem with this particular idea, however, is securing the combined 
intelligence database against computer hackers. 
 
216 Id. (Additional Views of Sen. Mike DeWine at 7).   
 
217 Id. (Additional Views of Sen. Mike DeWine at 8). 
 
218 Id. 
 
219 Id. 
 
220 Id. 
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221 Id.  (Additional Views of Sen. Mike DeWine at 8-15).  As explained by DeWine, this might include 
attendance at a radical Islamic mosque in the U.S., allowing the American operative to travel abroad, 
receiving training at a terrorist camp and to “infiltrate organizations like al Qaeda.”  Id.  (Additional 
Views of Sen. Mike DeWine at 14). 
 
222 Id. (Additional Views of Rep. Jane Harman at 1). 
 
223 Id. 
 
224 Id. (Additional Views of Rep. Jane Harman at 2).  In this regard, she went on to note that the “raw 
databases” of many American intelligence agencies like the CIA and the NSA “contain extremely 
valuable information that does not get noticed, shared, integrated, or acted upon.”  Id. 
 
225 Id. (Additional Views of Sen. John Kyl & Sen. Pat Roberts at 1-4). 
 
226 Id. (Additional Views of Sen. John Kyl & Sen. Pat Roberts at 4). 
 
227 Id. (Additional Views of Sen. John Kyl & Sen. Pat Roberts at 20-1).   
 
228 Id. (Additional Views of Sen. John Kyl & Sen. Pat Roberts at 20-1).   
 
229 Id. (Additional Views of Sen. John Kyl & Sen. Pat Roberts at 1) (emphasis added). 
 
230 Id.  
 
231 Id. (Additional Views of Sen. John Kyl & Sen. Pat Roberts at 1-2). 
 
232 Id. (Additional Views of Sen. John Kyl &  Sen. Pat Roberts at 2). 
 
233 Id. (Additional Views of Sen. John Kyl &  Sen. Pat Roberts at 2). 
 
234 Id. 
 
235 Id. 
 
236 Id.  
 
237 Id. 
 
238 See supra notes 228-37 and accompanying text. 
 
239 Id. (Additional Views of Sen. John Kyl & Pat Roberts at 4). 
 
240 Id. 
 
241 Id. 
 
242 Id. 
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243 Id. (Additional View of Sen. John Kyl & Sen. Pat Roberts at 4-5). 
 
244 Id. (Additional Views of Sen. John Kyl & Sen. Pat Roberts at 5-8) (discussing a “legacy of caution” 
at key American intelligence agencies dealing with official concern about past congressional criticisms 
of civil liberties violations and a cultural ethos that was afraid to make mistakes). 
 
245 Id. (Additional Views of Sen. John Kyl & Sen. Pat Roberts at 8-13) (discussing the “contradiction 
between high-ranking officials’ complaints about inadequate resources and the fact that, according to 
the Office Management and Budget, the intelligence agencies usually got what they asked for”). 
 
246 Id. (Additional Views of Sen. John Kyl & Sen. Pat Roberts at 13-15) (criticizing ambiguous legal 
materials from presidential decision directives to the FISA statute). 
 
247 Id. (Additional Views of Sen. John Kyl & Sen. Pat Roberts at 15-17) (Among other things, noting that 
“al Qaeda’s attack on Washington and New York occurred after a long period of poor leadership at the 
highest levels of the U.S. Government regarding terrorism.  Despite repeated assaults on the United 
States and its interests—the 1993 World Trade Center attack, the bombing of the American embassies in 
Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, the attack on the U.S.S. Cole in 2000, to name a few—the U.S. 
Government was still unwilling to treat terrorism as a true national security issue until 9/11”). 
 
248 Id. (Additional Views of Sen. John Kyl & Sen. Pat Roberts at 17-20) (criticizing the failure of the JIR 
to fully discuss the failure of the U.S. State Department to deny visa access by 15 of the 19 hijackers 
from Saudi Arabia). 
 
249 Id. (Additional Views of Sen. John Kyl & Sen. Pat Roberts at 20) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
250 Id. 
 
251 Id. 
 
252 For an excellent discussion of the constitutional and interactive problems of the congressional 
oversight of the executive branch see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRET,
LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 203-10 (2000). 
 
253 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 1. 
 
254 Id. at art. I, § 8; art. I § 9. 
 
255 David Nather, Congress As Watchdog: Asleep on the Job?, 62 CONG. QUART. WKLY 1190, 1190-93 (May 
22, 2004).  Prominent instances of past congressional oversight investigations include: the 1792 inquiry 
on the Indian attacks on American troops—the first congressional oversight inquiry—by a select House 
committee investigating the circumstances of an attack that killed about 600 U.S. troops commanded 
by Maj. Gen. Arthur St. Clair, id. at 1190; the first joint House-Senate investigative panel, conducted 
from December 1861 through May 1865, that examined “past and future battle plans, disloyal 
employees, navy installations, and war supplies and contracts” (considered “the worst-run 
congressional inquiry until the McCarthy hearings of the 1950s”), id.; the Financial Trusts investigation 
from February 1912 to February 1913 by a House Banking and Currency subcommittee looking into “the 
concentration of money and credit, especially the control exercised by two New York banks,” with the 
“panel’s report help[ing] [the] enactment of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913” among other legislation; 
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id.; the investigations by the Senate Subcommittee on Public Lands and Surveys and the Senate Select 
Committee to Investigate the Justice Department, during 1923-24, into the “lease of naval oil reserves, 
including one called Teapot Dome under a Wyoming rock formation by the Harding Administration”, id. 
at 1190-91; the Defense Programs inquiry by the Special Senate Committee to Investigate the National 
Defense Program, during March 1941 to April 1948 (viewed as “the most effective congressional 
investigation ever”) into “the status of national defenses to a more specific review of war mobilization 
problems, shortages of critical materials such as aluminum, and fraud among contractors and 
lobbyists”, id. at 1191; the Kefauver Crime Hearings, from May 1950 to Summer 1951, being the Senate 
Special Committee to Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce, which was “the first 
congressional hearings to draw the rapt attention of television viewers across the nation as prominent 
gangsters and underworld leaders were paraded in front of the panel”, id.; the McCarthy Investigations, 
from January 1953 to December 1954, as the Senate Government Operations Committee’s Permanent 
Investigations Committee conducted “a sweeping array of probes of purported communist subversion of 
the U.S. government and the United Nations,” id. at 1191-92; the Watergate Hearings, during January 
1973 to July 1974 of the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities and the House 
Judiciary Committee’s impeachment inquiry into President Richard M. Nixon’s illegal activities, id. at 
1192; the Senate “Select Committee to Study Government Operations With Respect to Intelligence 
Activities,” from January 1975 to April 1976, chaired by Senator Frank Church (D-Idaho), focusing on 
the CIA’s domestic spying activities during the Vietnam War and leading to the formation of the Senate 
Select Committee on Intelligence, id. at 1192-93; and the Iran Contra hearings, from November 1986 to 
August 1987, before the jointly-convened House and Senate Intelligence Committees, id. at 1193. 
 
256 Id. at 1191. 
 
257 Id. at 1191-94. 
 
258 Id. at 1193. 
 
259 Id. 
 
260 Christopher Marquis, Reports On Attacks Are Gripping, Not Dry, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2004, at A23. 
 
261 See Helen Fessenden, Intelligence Panels’ Mission Corroded by Air of Distrust, 62 CONG. QUART.
WKLY. 730 (Mar. 27, 2004). 
 
262 Id. at 733. 
 
263 Editorial, Wake Up the Watchdogs, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2004, at A26. 
 
264 Id.  See also 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 419-21 (recommending consolidation of 
congressional oversight over counterterrorism and fostering expertise of specific members of Congress). 
 
265 Editorial, supra note 263, at A26. 
 
266 Id. 
 
267 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
268 Id.  See also 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 419-21. 
86
269 See supra notes 119-32 and accompanying text; see infra note 304. 
 
270 Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 
117 HARV. L. REV. 1015, 1062 (2004). 
 
271 Cf. id. at 1021-53 (discussing the details of institutional breakdown in public schools, mental health 
facilities, prisons, police departments and housing authorities). 
 
272 See generally HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND 
APPLICATION OF LAW 1-4 (tenth ed. 1958) (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, eds. 1994) 
(theorizing that human conflict, in the satisfaction of human wants is an inescapable feature of human 
interdependence and in resolving this inherent and systemic conflict “affirmative and knowledgeable 
cooperation” through law is necessary.  Moreover, Hart and Sacks recognized that as part of their 
fundamental interdependence with others, “people form themselves into groups for the protection and 
advancement of their common interests”; so, too, individuals establish “[t]he [i]nstitutionalization of 
[p]rocedures for the [s]ettlement of [q]uestions of [g]roup [c]oncern”). 
 
273 Id. at 6 (emphasis added). 
 
274 Guido Calabresi, An Introduction to Legal Thought: Four Approaches to Law and to the Allocation 
of Body Parts, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2113, 2113 (2003). 
 
275 Id. at 2125, n. 50 (original emphasis) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
276 Sabel & Simon, supra note 270, at 1053. 
 
277 Id. 
 
278 Id. 
 
279 Id. at 1067.  For a general theoretical discussion of the challenges and tools available for the 
conscientious American legislator see Robert F. Blomquist, The Good American Legislator: Some Legal 
Process Perspectives and Possibilities, 30 AKRON L. REV. (2005) (forthcoming). 
 
280 Sabel & Simon, supra note 270, at 1067. 
 
281 Id. at 1068. 
 
282 Id. 
 
283 Id. 
 
284 Id. 
 
285 Id. 
 
286 Id. at 1069 (footnote omitted). 
 
87
287 Id. 
 
288 Id. 
 
289 Id. 
 
290 Id. 
 
291 Id. at 1070. 
 
292 Id. 
 
293 Id. at 1071.  
 
294 Id.  According to Professors Sabel and Simon: 
 
[W]hatever the technical legal status of the plans, their function is not so 
much to coerce obedience as to introduce internal deliberation and external 
transparency.  Forcing the [stakeholders] … to agree on a clear description of 
their practices puts pressure on them to reflect on and explain what they are 
doing.  Moreover, the practice norms enable outsiders to determine what the 
practitioners are up to.  They complement the performance norms by 
describing the inputs that generate the outputs indicated by those norms. 
 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
 
295 Id. 
 
296 Id. 
 
297 Id. at 1072. 
 
298 Id. 
 
299 As an excellent model for private sector input into sensitive national security matters see NATIONAL 
INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, GLOBAL TRENDS 2015: A DIALOGUE ABOUT THE FUTURE WITH NONGOVERNMENTAL EXPERTS NIC 
2000-02 (December 2000) (discussing, among other “drivers and trends” the development of 
“transnational terrorism” and possible American responses). 
 
300 Sabel & Simon, supra note 270, at 1072. 
 
301 Id. 
 
302 Id. at 1073. 
 
303 Id. 
304 The danger of these proposed reforms is that they will end up being more process than real 
congressional oversight of executive branch counterterrorism policy.  Cf. Orde F. Kittrie, More Process 
88
Than Peace: Legitimacy, Compliance, and the Oslo Accords (Book Review Essay), 101 MICH. L. REV. 1661, 
1663 (2003) (the reliance of the drafters of the Oslo Accords relied to an excessive degree “on open-
ended gradualism and ambiguity in their efforts to turn peace negotiations into a legally binding, final 
settlement” which “reliance proved to be disastrously counterproductive”).  For the rather tepid 
suggestions by the 9/11 Commission to improve congressional oversight of intelligence and homeland 
security see THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 156, at 419-21.   
 
For interesting recent articles discussing the constitutional dimensions of the post-9/11 terrorism 
environment—beyond the scope of this Article—see e.g. Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses 
to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011 (2003); Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency 
Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029 (2004). 
 
For an account of congressional bills to incorporate the 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT’s recommendations into 
legislation see Philip Shenon, Bipartisan Bill Offered on 9/11 Panel’s Proposals, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 
2004, at A1.  See also Editorial, Duty Chafes on Capitol Hill, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2004, at A26 (“The 
bipartisan Report’s parallel warning that Congress must reform itself to apply true intelligence 
oversight is flat-lining so far on Capitol Hill as rival committee leaders defend a checkerboard full of 
important fiefs.”) 
 
Congress—in late 2004—with prodding by President Bush, ended up passing legislation that encapsulated 
many of the 9/11 Commission recommendations—some of which had also been suggested by the 
congressional Joint Inquiry.  Perhaps the most significant change in the intelligence law reforms was 
the creation of the position of National Intelligence Director.  See Intelligence, 63 CONG. QUART. WKLY.
24 (Jan. 3, 2005) (“The first homeland security question to be resolved is whether the House will create 
a more powerful committee to oversee [intelligence] or continue to fragment oversight among dozens 
of panels”; “Congress passed the intelligence overhaul bill, but now the Intelligence and Homeland 
Security committees will have to deal with what they wrought, overseeing yet another major 
government reorganization.”) 
